

The Ongoing War between the United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure and Militant Islamists: Is the Next 9/11 Preventable?

**A Monograph
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Abstract

THE ONGOING WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRUCTURE AND MILITANT ISLAMISTS: IS THE NEXT 9/11 PREVENTABLE? by MAJ John M. Demko, US Army, 72 pages.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the militant Islamist threat within the United States, to determine whether the current United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure can prevent the next significant terror attack in the homeland, and recommend improvements to the National Counter-Terrorism Structure organization and practices.

The first two chapters define militant Islam and explore the likelihood that it remains a persistent threat within the United States. The paper focuses on militant Islamists rather than all ideological threats in the United States and on the most damaging of potential terror attacks. A selection of six terrorist events illustrates the history of militant Islamist actions in the United States from 1993 to 2007, defines the threat, and aids in the analysis and evaluation of the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure later in the paper. Support for a persistent and plausible militant Islamist threat inside the United States and the six-year absence of a significant terror attack in the homeland is shown to be a result of slow, patient militant Islamist planning for an attack more powerful than that of 9/11.

Using the defined threat as a foundation, the third chapter describes the existing National Counter-Terrorism Structure comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement and homeland security organizations. The chapter focuses upon the Structure's policy, procedure, and resource implementation; communications and information sharing; and contingency plans and rehearsals.

The fourth chapter analyzes whether the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure can defend the homeland against the next militant Islamist terror attack in the homeland. The analysis uses selected *Principles of War* from the US Army's Field Manual 3-0 and focuses upon the extent to which national, state, and local law enforcement and homeland security organizations coordinate and share information about known and potential terrorist threats and learn through their examining and rehearsing threat plans and scenarios. This chapter also makes recommendations to improve any problems in the organization and practices of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure discovered during the analysis. The importance of identifying seams in the Structure is seen when looking at the context of the 9/11 terror attacks. Prior to September 2001, a significant seam in the Counter-Terrorism Structure existed because the CIA and FBI did not conduct synchronized information sharing and coordination. That seam aided al-Qaeda on 9/11. Proposed recommendations concerning the National Counter-Terrorism Structure are evaluated with the same Principles of War as was used during the evaluation of the existing structure.

The United States is at war in the homeland with militant Islamists- the enemy threat that already exists within our borders. They enter through the porous US borders with Canada and Mexico or are homegrown from citizens and long-term residents of the United States within those same borders. The forces fighting on behalf of the United States are the law enforcement and homeland security organizations who make up the United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure. That Structure is comprised of the Department of Homeland Security, Northern Command, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the federal level, similar organizations at the state level, and city and county law enforcement and security personnel at the local level.

The addition of new counter-terrorism organizations as well as new and better information sharing and collaboration centers in the United States allows the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure to provide better security than before September 11, 2001. Is it good enough to prevent the next militant Islamist terror attack on the scale of 9/11 within the homeland?

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On the morning of 9/11, we saw that the terrorists have to be right only once to kill our people, while we have to be right every time to stop them... Nine-Eleven lifted the veil on a threat that is far broader and more dangerous than we saw that morning, an enemy that was not sated by the destruction inflicted that day and is determined to strike again. To answer this threat and protect our people, we need more than retaliation; we need more than a reaction to the last attack; we need to do everything in our power to stop the next attack.¹ – George W. Bush

INTRODUCTION

When militant Islamists flew airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, terrorism became real to citizens of the United States (US).² Before then, terror attacks were events that happened abroad. Even the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing did not wake most Americans to the reality that there were potentially thousands of people around the world and within the US who would conduct terror attacks on American soil.³ The events of 9/11 made Americans aware that they were vulnerable to terrorism in the United States and that the attacks would change their lives. As jarring as the attacks on 9/11 were to America, imagine the effect of an even more deadly attack.

The Next Terror Attack

Picture Columbus, Ohio bustling with typical Tuesday morning college-town activity. Students, business owners, and visitors are doing what people do in a university town. Then, in a house at the corner of Maryland Avenue and Lowell Road, a small nuclear bomb detonates. Because of its low nuclear yield, it only destroys a few city blocks; however, it is a crucial section of the city as the destruction and fallout spreads onto the Defense Logistics yard and the

¹ President, Address, "Remarks to the Georgia Public Policy Foundation in Atlanta, Georgia," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 42, no. 36 (September 7, 2006): 1581.

² Daniel Pipes, "A New Round of Anger and Humiliation: Islam after 9/11," [danielpipes.org](http://www.danielpipes.org), <http://www.danielpipes.org/article/417> (accessed February 12, 2008). Daniel Pipes refers to militant Islam as Islamism and that it takes the religion of Islam and turns it into the basis of a totalitarian ideology that shares much with prior versions, namely fascism and Marxism-Leninism. Like them, for example, it seeks to replace capitalism and liberalism as the reigning world system.

Columbus Airport just to the east and northeast. The blast also severs East Broad Street, the main artery in and out of the campus. As word of the nuclear attack spreads throughout the United States and the world, American hubris, regained during years without a successful terror attack in the homeland, is shattered. Because of the attack in Columbus, the US economy and the way Americans prioritize their security and their civil liberties would all change significantly. The stresses experienced after 9/11 pale in comparison to those that would follow this hypothetical scenario.

One may argue that the Columbus, Ohio nuclear blast scenario is not realistic. On September 10, 2001, many people thought that suicidal terrorists flying commercial airplanes into buildings inside the United States was too farfetched, but it happened. Stephen Flynn, senior fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, provided a plausible scenario describing militant Islamist terrorists executing four simultaneous weapons of mass effect within the United States.⁴ He painted a realistic scenario where militant Islamists easily acquired and smuggled radioactive material into the United States. Although the attacks portrayed in his book were dirty bombs and not nuclear devices, the horror in Mr. Flynn's story comes from its realistic possibility.⁵

Like Mr. Flynn, others have speculated about the next terror attack in the United States. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's National Security Advisor from 1993 to 1997, described three early twenty-first century terror attacks: an anthrax attack, a cyber warfare attack, and the sinking of a cruise ship in the Panama Canal. His book, *Six Nightmares*, written before 9/11, gave the three scenarios as examples of how a weaker nation could use realistic terror methods to attack

³ Daniel Pipes, *Militant Islam Reaches America*, (New York: Norton Publishing, 2003), xi.

⁴ Stephen Flynn, *America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 17-35.

⁵ Encarta Dictionary, "dirty bomb," Encarta, http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_701705604/dirty_bomb.html (accessed January 18, 2008). Encarta defines a dirty bomb as: a bomb spreading radioactive material dispersed by means of conventional explosives.

the United States.⁶ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon did not use a potential scenario in their book, but they did predict America's future when they said, "We are losing. Four years and two wars after the attacks of September 11, 2001, America is heading for a repeat of the events of that day, or perhaps something worse."⁷ These authors have painted disturbing scenarios that should cause Americans to investigate those threats and the status of the Counter-Terrorism Structure designed to prevent them.

If another terror attack does occur in the United States, it would not likely resemble the 9/11 attacks, or the other terror plots since then, because of the reactive security measures implemented by the US Counter-Terrorism Structure.⁸ After 9/11, increased airline security procedures forbade sharp objects from airplanes, because the suicide hijackers used box cutters and knives to overtake the crews.⁹ While the United States implemented security measures in response to the 9/11 attacks, Richard Reid attempted to blow up an airplane with a bomb in his shoe.¹⁰ After his failed attack, more reactive security measures forced air travelers to remove their shoes for checks prior to boarding their aircraft.¹¹ In August 2006, authorities in the United Kingdom arrested twenty-five alleged terrorists for plotting to take bottles of liquid explosives

⁶ Anthony Lake, *6 Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America can Meet Them* (Boston, New York, London: Little, Brown and Company, 2000), 1-12, 33-37, 66-74.

⁷ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Next Attack* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2005), xiii.

⁸ The term United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure refers to all of the federal, state, and local law enforcement and homeland security organizations as a single entity united in one of their primary missions of countering terrorism. For variation and brevity, Counter-Terrorism Structure or Structure may be used for the full version.

⁹ Thomas H. Kean (Chair) and Lee H. Hamilton (Vice Chair), *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 1-46.

¹⁰ Michael Elliott, "The Shoe Bomber's World," Time.com, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,203478,00.html> (accessed February 11, 2008).

¹¹ Brock N. Meeks, "TSA looks to upgrade shoe security procedures," MSNBC.com, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8899022> (accessed February 11, 2008).

onto airplanes bound for the US and detonate them in order to down the aircraft.¹² Soon thereafter, both in the United States and United Kingdom, airline passengers could no longer carry liquids or gels into the aircraft cabins.¹³ The trend is troubling: Since September 11, 2001, militant Islamists evolve their terror tactics while the United States is still reacting to the *last* terror plot or attack. The United States must get ahead of the terrorists in order to answer the question: Is the United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure able to prevent the *next* terror attack?

Although the primary focus of this paper is on the seams, or problem areas, within the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure, the security improvements since September 11, 2001 cannot be ignored. First, the fact that many would acknowledge a Counter-Terrorism Structure exists is an improvement. There are also two new headquarters within this structure; namely, the Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command (NORTHCOM). The former is a new cabinet level position with a Secretary head who reports directly to the President. NORTHCOM is the newest combatant command within the Department of Defense with a geographic responsibility for the continental United States, Canada, and their surrounding waters. The FBI too has improved. Before 9/11, Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) offices existed in only a handful of locations in the United States and now every FBI office in the United States has a JTTF within it. The JTTF is a collaboration center where information on current and potential terror threats is shared among federal, state, county, local, and private industry law enforcement and homeland security organizations. At lower levels of the Counter-Terrorism structure, fusion centers exist within nearly all fifty states. This is a completely new concept since 9/11 and they mirror much of the information sharing and collaboration attributes of the JTTF. As this short

¹² Cable News Network, "Agent infiltrated terror cell, U.S. says," CNN.com, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/08/10/us.security/index.html> (accessed February 11, 2008).

¹³ Leslie Miller, "Getting Sensible About Airline Carry-on Restrictions," Time.com, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1538747,00.html> (accessed February 11, 2008).

section has shown, not all the news is bad concerning the United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure. However, this paper will focus predominantly in the areas within the Counter-Terrorism Structure where recommendations may offer solutions to problems or seams that exist.

Structure and Method

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the militant Islamist threat within the United States, to determine whether the current United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure can prevent the next significant terror attack in the homeland, and recommend improvements to the National Counter-Terrorism Structure organization and practices.

The first two chapters define militant Islam and explore the likelihood that it remains a persistent threat within the United States. The definition of militant Islam comes from established subject matter expert authors on Islam, most notably Daniel Pipes and Stephen Coughlin. The following portion explains the paper's focus on militant Islamists rather than all ideological threats in the United States and its focus on the most damaging of potential terror attacks. A selection of six terrorist events briefly illustrates the history of militant Islamist actions in the United States from 1993 to 2007. The six events are neither exhaustive nor are they all similar in their methods or results. In addition to their historical value, the events have specific attributes that make them important to defining the threat and to the analysis and evaluation of the US National Counter-Terrorism structure later in the paper. Support for a persistent and plausible militant Islamist threat inside the United States is shown by examining five reasons for the six and a half years since 9/11 without a significant terror attack. Four of the explanations are shown to be incomplete by exploring militant Islamist doctrine and messages and the availability of material and willing men to conduct a future terrorist attack. The result is that a plausible militant Islamist threat still exists in the United States and the six-year absence of a significant terrorist attack is a result of slow, patient militant Islamist planning of an attack more powerful than that

of September 11, 2001.

Using the defined threat as a foundation, the third chapter describes the existing National Counter-Terrorism Structure comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement and homeland security organizations. The chapter focuses upon the Structure's policy, procedure, and resource implementation; communications and information sharing; and contingency plans and rehearsals. Information for the description of the structure was derived from interviews of members of the organizations within the structure, surveys sent to state, county, and local law enforcement and homeland security organizations, and secondary sources on homeland security.

The fourth chapter analyzes whether the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure can defend the homeland against the next militant Islamist terror attack in the homeland. The analysis uses selected *Principles of War* from the US Army's Field Manual 3-0 and focuses upon the extent to which national, state, and local law enforcement and homeland security organizations coordinate and share information about known and potential terrorist threats and learn through their examining and rehearsing threat plans and scenarios. That analysis relies heavily upon the aforementioned interviews and survey responses. This chapter also provides several recommendations to improve any problems or seams in the organization and practices of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure discovered during the analysis. The importance of identifying seams in the Structure is seen when looking at the context of the 9/11 terror attacks. Prior to September 2001, a significant seam in the Counter-Terrorism structure existed because the CIA and FBI did not conduct synchronized information sharing and coordination. That seam aided al-Qaeda on 9/11.¹⁴ Any proposed recommendations concerning the National Counter-Terrorism Structure are also evaluated with the same *Principles of War* as was used during the evaluation of the existing structure.

¹⁴ Bill Gertz, *Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11* (Washington: Regnery Publishing, INC, 2002), 36-37. The book details failure after failure of both the CIA and the FBI

DEFINITION AND SELECTED HISTORY OF THE MILITANT ISLAMIST THREAT IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1993

The Atlantic and Pacific oceans no longer provide the security against attacks on the United States mainland that they once did. The events of September 11th, 2001 proved that point. The enemy on that day was al-Qaeda, a radical Sunni sect of Islam led by Osama Bin Laden that is the most visible face for the new threat called militant Islam and the replacement for the Cold War threat of Communism.¹⁵

Militant Islamist Defined and Focused

In the opening pages of this paper, Mr. Pipes' defined militant Islam or Islamism as a totalitarian ideology and compared it to fascism.¹⁶ In another work, he provided a more detailed definition that included some broad demographics and methodology for militant Islam:

...a utopian ideology, initiated in the twentieth century, that attracts only a portion of Muslims (perhaps 10 to 15 percent), seeks to capture control of governments, and is nakedly aggressive toward all who stand in its way, no matter what their faith.¹⁷

By separating out the 10-15 percent of fundamentalists, Mr. Pipes seemed to advocate the existence of a more moderate 85 to 90 percent of Muslims. Mr. Stephen Coughlin, a former Intelligence Analyst with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, disagrees with a separation of Muslims into fundamentalists and moderates. He argued in his master's thesis that there really is no moderate Muslims as defined by the current US doctrine.¹⁸ That is because the United States Intelligence Community's Current Approach to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield does not look at the

analysts to put together information that could have prevented the 9/11 terror attacks.

¹⁵ Robert Taylor, "Containment: A Viable Strategy for Success in the GWOT" (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2007), 1.

¹⁶ Daniel Pipes, "A New Round of Anger and Humiliation: Islam after 9/11," [danielpipes.org](http://www.danielpipes.org/article/417), <http://www.danielpipes.org/article/417> (accessed February 12, 2008).

¹⁷ Daniel Pipes, *Militant Islam Reaches America* (New York: Norton, 2003), 3.

¹⁸ Stephen Coughlin, "'To Our Great Detriment': Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad"

Qur'an as the basis for Muslims' doctrinal thoughts about *jihad*. Mr. Coughlin's complaints with the US Intelligence Community are applicable to Mr. Pipes' definition as well:

...the Current Approach's starting point that "true" Islam is (doctrinally) "moderate" and that the enemy has taken "extreme" interpretations of Islam to support its doctrinal views. This is the universally accepted, unchallenged assumption...the terms "extreme" and "moderate" are stripped of their ability to make meaningful distinctions concerning either the actual enemy or his threat doctrine.¹⁹

Mr. Coughlin disagrees with Mr. Pipes because it is Islam and not just Islamists that require analysis in order to find the true nature of the current threat. This paper will refer to militant Islamists as those Muslims who attempt to further Islam using violent *jihad* as proscribed within the Qur'an.

This monograph focuses only on the militant Islamist threat rather than all ideological threats within the United States. Three compelling reasons to focus here are previous successful militant Islamist attacks within the United States, militant Islamists continued calls for attacks within the United States, and the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This last factor is crucially important because both conflicts are within Muslim countries. The presence of Western troops in Muslim nations is arguably a source of significant angst among many Muslims and provides a powerful recruiting tool for militant Islamists. Daniel Pipes summarized this point:

In particular, Islamists see the United States as an aggressive force that seeks to steal Muslims' resources, exploit their labor, and undermine their religion...This outlook has the crucial implication that violence against Americans is viewed as defensive in nature.²⁰

Having explained the ideological threat of militant Islam and the reasons this paper focuses there, the range of potential terror attacks can be narrowed. This paper proposes a continuum of potential terrorist attacks in the United States with the criteria being a combination

(master's thesis, National Defense Intelligence College, 2007), 10-14.

¹⁹ Stephen Coughlin, "'To Our Great Detriment': Ignoring What Extremists Say About *Jihad*" (master's thesis, National Defense Intelligence College, 2007), 22.

²⁰ Daniel Pipes, "A New Round of Anger and Humiliation: Islam after 9/11," [danielpipes.org](http://www.danielpipes.org), <http://www.danielpipes.org/article/417> (accessed February 12, 2008).

of total potential damage to the US economy, infrastructure, and American deaths.²¹ That continuum or terror spectrum (Figure 1) ranges from the most damaging attack, a nuclear bomb detonation at the right end of the scale, to the least immediately damaging, fund raising, at the left end of the scale. A dirty-bomb, agro-terrorism, small arms attacks, and kidnapping are all




Figure 1 - Terror Attack Spectrum²²

examples of potential terror attacks that lie between the two extremes along the Terror Attack Spectrum. This monograph focuses on the threats of the greatest magnitude, because they would have the greatest impact on Americans' way of life.

Recent History of the Militant Islamist Threat in the United States

Since 1993, militant Islamists have achieved, or attempted to launch many terror attacks in the United States. Of those, the six contemporary incidents that are the most relevant to this paper are the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 9/11 terror attacks, Richard Reid's attempted "shoe bomb" attack in August 2002, the Lackawanna Six arrests in the Fall of 2002, the Portland Seven arrests in the Fall of 2001, and the 2007 plot to attack Fort Dix. These six events best illustrate the hypotheses about the militant Islamist threat within this chapter and

²¹ Robert Looney, "Economic Costs to the United States Stemming From the 9/11 Attacks," *Strategic Insights* 1, no. 6 (August 2002): 1.

²² The figure is author-created and does not exhaust all potential terror attack threats. The arrangement of the individual attacks is the author's opinion except for the 9/11 Attacks and Agro-terrorism where data from the two references are used to rank the latter as more damaging than the former because of its significantly higher costs and nation-wide impact.

throughout the remainder of the paper. The following sections summarize the most pertinent historical background of the events.

The 1993 World Trade Center Attack

On February 26, 1993, a Ryder van filled with a very powerful bomb exploded in the parking garage under the World Trade Center (WTC). The blast killed six people, injured more than a thousand others, caused approximately \$300 million in property damage, and cut all electricity, heat, emergency power, running water, and communications to both towers of the WTC. The bomb consisted of 1,000 pounds of urea and 105 gallons of nitric acid for the bomb's main charge; 60 gallons of sulfuric acid for nitroglycerin boosters; one gallon of ethyl alcohol to stabilize the nitroglycerin; and a 25-pound bag of sodium carbonate to neutralize acids during the mixing process. The detonators contained a 16-ounce can of smokeless powder.²³

From September 03, 1992 until February 25, 1993 the militant Islamist bombers- Ahmad Ajaj, Ramzi Yousef, Mohammed Salameh, Mahmud Abouhalima, Abdul Rahman Yasin, and Nidal Ayyad- purchased chemicals and tanks of hydrogen gas, assembled the components into a bomb, surveyed the World Trade Center (WTC), rented a Ryder van, and loaded the 1,500 pound bomb into the van. On February 26, 1993, they drove the van to the WTC and parked in the red parking lot on the B-2 level of the WTC Complex. They set the bomb to detonate for early afternoon and left the scene thinking that the explosion would destroy all of the evidence linking them to the blast, but that did not occur. Critical pieces of the rental van, including the vehicle identification number, were recovered and the Federal Bureau of Investigation linked them to the rental agency and then to Salameh who was arrested on March 4, 1993. His arrest established

²³ J. Gilmore Childers and Henry J. DePippo, "Hearing on: Foreign Terrorists in America: Five Years After the World Trade Center," Senate Judiciary Committee: Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, <http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/childers.htm> (accessed February 13, 2008).

linkages that culminated in the arrests of Ajaj, Abouhalima, and Ayyad. Because he was able to flee the United States after the attack, it took nearly two years before the Pakistani military apprehended Ramzi Yousef and delivered him to the United States. Eventually all five terrorists were tried, convicted, and sentenced to 240 years in prison. Only Yazin remains free after fleeing the country.²⁴

9/11 Terror Attacks

The details of the militant Islamist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 are well known to most Americans. Of the nineteen attackers, fifteen men were from Saudi Arabia, two from the United Arab Emirates, one from Egypt, and one from Lebanon. They boarded American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11) and United Airlines 175 (UA 175) in Boston, Massachusetts; American Airlines Flight 77 (AA 77) in Dulles, Virginia; United Airlines Flight 93 (UA 93) in Newark, New Jersey.²⁵ After the four flights departed their respective cities, the nineteen terrorists took control of the aircraft anywhere from 30 to 46 minutes into their flights using knives, box cutters, and mace to kill and control the aircrews and other passengers.²⁶ The terrorists flew three of the planes into both towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Passengers on Flight UA 93 overtook their aircraft from the terrorists to prevent its use as a weapon. Before they could regain control, the terrorist piloting the airplane crashed it near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.²⁷ The attacks were the first realization for many Americans that al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden existed and that militant Islamists had grievances against America.²⁸ The attacks shut down all trading on Wall Street for one week, stopped all

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Kean and Hamilton, 1-4.

²⁶ Ibid., 4-14.

²⁷ Ibid., 31-34.

²⁸ Daniel Pipes, *Militant Islam Reaches America*, (New York: Norton Publishing, 2003), xi.

commercial flights from September 11-12, 2001, and cost the lives of nearly 3,000 men, women, and children.²⁹

Richard Reid and the Shoe Bomb Attack

On December 22, 2001, Richard Reid was on American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami when he attempted to light the fuse to a sophisticated bomb that was in his shoe. The bomb had enough explosives to blow a hole in the fuselage of the aircraft, and because of its altitude, cause the aircraft to crash. He was subdued when a flight attendant noticed the smell of a lit match. The flight then diverted to Boston, Massachusetts where he was arrested. Richard Reid was not born a Muslim, but converted in the early 1990s while incarcerated in Britain. Once leaving prison, he gravitated toward militant Islam and at some point met Zacarias Moussaoui at the Finsbury Park mosque. Finsbury Park in London, England is the center of what French authorities call Londonistan because of its radicalized community, fiery prayer meetings, and Britain's "watchful tolerance" of extremists.³⁰ Reid eventually traveled to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Turkey, and Europe for training and indoctrination prior to his failed 2001 attack. Richard Reid's attempted terror attack must be considered in this study, because the attack took place on an American-owned aircraft, the plane was enroute to the United States, and because he was being prosecuted within the United States.³¹

²⁹ Alexandra Twin, "Stocks: 5 Years after 9/11," CNN.COM, http://money.cnn.com/2006/09/08/markets/markets_fiveyearsater/index.htm, Laurence Zuckerman (Air) "A Day of Terror: The Airlines," NY Times, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CEEDE1238F931A2575AC0A9679C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1>, and Alex Spektor, "September 11, 2001 Victims," www.september11victims.com/september11victims/victims_list.htm (accessed March 24, 2008).

³⁰ Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan* (New York: Encounter Books, 2006), x and Michael Elliott, "The Shoe Bomber's World," Time.com, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,203478,00.html> (accessed February 11, 2008).

³¹ Ibid.

Lackawanna Six

Lackawanna Six refers to six Yemeni-Americans and US citizens from Lackawanna, New York arrested in September 2002 and later charged with terrorism related crimes. The six were Mukhtar Al-Bakri, Sahim Alwan, Faysal Galab, Shafal Mosed, Yaseinn Taher, and Yahya Goba. Although this incident was labeled the Lackawanna (or Buffalo) Six, the cell actually included eight active members. The seventh member, Jaber A. Elbaneh, is still at large after escaping from a Yemeni prison in February 2006.³² Kamal Derwish, the final member of the group, was born in Lackawanna and raised in Saudi Arabia. He received advanced weapons and al-Qaeda recruiting training in Afghanistan and fought as a mujahedeen in Bosnia in the 1990s. He had ties to al-Qaeda and sought out devout men at the Lackawanna mosque.³³

Derwish became the spiritual leader of the other seven and helped to radicalize them toward Salafi Islam.³⁴ Derwish met regularly after evening prayers with up to 20 regular attendees, the other seven of the Lackawanna cell among them. Although the young men in the Lackawanna cell were initially non-religious and more interested in playing soccer than engaging in *jihad*, Derwish's teaching of Islam encouraged the men toward being more devout Muslims. After one-on-one recruiting, he eventually convinced the seven other men to travel to Afghanistan to receive jihadist training. The seven left for Afghanistan in two groups in April and May 2001 and met Mr. Derwish in Pakistan. They were the first known US citizens to train at an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, prior to 9/11.³⁵ While at the al-Farooq training camp, the men met Osama

³² FBI Press Release, "Recent Escapees from Yemen Prison Added to Most Wanted Terrorists and Seeking Information - War on Terrorism Lists," FBI.gov, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel06/mwtl_yemen022306.htm (accessed February 14, 2008).

³³ Lowell Bergman and Matthew Purdy, "Where the Trail Led: Between Evidence and Suspicion; Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case," <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE1DF133FF931A25753C1A9659C8B63> (accessed March 23, 2008), 3-5.

³⁴ Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York: NYPD, 2007), 59. The context shows the authors mean Jihadi Safafi Islam or militant Islam.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 56-64.

Bin Laden twice. After the second group visit with OBL, Mr. Alwan became disillusioned with the training and demanded to leave the training early.³⁶ At his first stop during his return to the United States, he received a third audience with Bin Laden in Kandahar. The latter asked him how American Muslims felt about “martyr operations.” Mr. Alwan said he dodged the question and asked about rumors of a conflict with America and Osama answered vaguely stating, “There’s been threats back and forth.” Mr. Alwan completed his return to Lackawanna and by the end of June 2001 reunited with three other men from the cell who left the training camp early. Goba, al-Bakri, Elbaneh, and Derwish completed their training, but only Goba and al-Bakri returned to the United States.³⁷ As described earlier Elbaneh remained overseas and is still at large. Derwish also remained overseas and his part in this story ended when he was one of six men killed by a Hellfire missile fired from a Predator unmanned aircraft in November 2002.³⁸

Evidence that led to the six arrests began to appear while the group was still overseas. An anonymous letter arrived at the Buffalo, New York FBI building that said, “Two terrorist[s] came to Lackawanna...for recruiting the Yemenite youth” in addition to naming the eight who had gone to a bin Laden camp.³⁹ After 9/11, the Buffalo FBI Office learned more about the Lackawanna cell’s travels to Afghanistan and built the case that led to their arrests.⁴⁰

Portland Seven

Six men- Marher Hawash, Patrice Lumumba Ford, Jeffrey Leon Battle, Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal, Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal, Habis Saoub- and October Martinique Lewis, the former wife of Battle, made up the Portland Seven group. Habis Saoub, born in Jordan, was the only

³⁶ Lowell Bergman and Matthew Purdy, 6.

³⁷ Ibid., 7.

³⁸ David Ensor, “U.S. Confirms Death of Man Linked to Alleged Buffalo Terror Cell,” CNN.com, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/11/12/yemen.blast.us> (accessed February 14, 2008).

³⁹ Lowell Bergman and Matthew Purdy, 6.

member not born in the United States. Saoub became the group's leader and influenced the others' ideology toward accepting militant Islam. The group conducted martial arts and firearms training in preparation to join al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and become part of the jihad against the United States Army. The six men flew to China in the autumn of 2001 in an attempt to get to Afghanistan. Ms. Lewis remained in the United States to coordinate their travels.⁴¹ The Chinese Army turned the six men around at the China/Pakistan border because they did not have proper travel visas. After this setback, Habis Saoub remained in Asia and later Pakistani forces killed him in 2003, but the other five men returned to the United States. All, including Ms. Lewis, were eventually arrested and charged with conspiracy to make war against the United States.⁴²

Plot to Attack Fort Dix

On May 7, 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested six foreign-born men who were planning to kill as many US Army soldiers as possible at Fort Dix, New Jersey using assault rifles and grenades. The FBI described five of the men- Eljvir Duka, Dritan Duka, Shain Duka, Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer, and Serdar Tatar- as "radical Islamists" not linked to al-Qaeda.⁴³ The Dukas were three brothers who were ethnic Albanians from the former Yugoslavia who lived in the United States most of their lives without becoming US citizens. Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer was a Jordanian native and Serdar Tatar was born in Turkey but was a legal resident of the United States. These five men became self-directed militant Islamists by viewing the martyrdom videos of two 9/11 suicide terrorists and circulating images of Osama Bin Laden. They conducted weapons training at a firing range in the Pocono Mountains and recorded

⁴⁰ Ibid., 8-10.

⁴¹ Silber and Bhatt, 56-64.

⁴² Ibid., 59-64.

⁴³ Dale Russakoff and Dan Eggen, "Six Charged in Plot To Attack Fort Dix," *washingtonpost.com*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/08/AR2007050800465.html> (accessed February 13, 2008).

themselves as they practiced firing their weapons, called for jihad, and yelled, “God is great” in Arabic.⁴⁴ They were apprehended before they carried out their attacks, because a video store clerk who was copying their video to DVD and saw the group’s terrorist training and chants, called the police, who then informed the FBI. A sixth man, Agron Abdullahu, an ethnic Albanian, was charged with helping the Dukas illegally obtain firearms.⁴⁵

Summary of the Militant Islamist Threat Since 1993

The six attempted and successful attacks from this chapter provide a brief overview of terrorism within the United States over the past fifteen years. The events are much more relevant and useful than simply historical data, because they can help evaluate the National Counter-Terrorism structure. As already stated, the events are not exhaustive of the history of terrorism within the United States since 1993. Collectively, the events suggest important attributes about the methods, the motivations, the men, and the materials for the attempted and successful attacks. The tactics, weapons, and planning that went into the attacks differ in nearly all of the cases. The Muslim men came from both abroad and from US citizens who were homegrown. Their backgrounds, their recruitment to militant Islam, and their motivations all provide important information that can help identify future militant Islamists and possibly find the means to prevent men (and potentially women) from becoming militant Islamists. The success or failure of their attacks offers the most valuable data when attempting to prevent another terror attack within the United States in the future. The failed attacks reveal holes or seams that may exist in future militant Islamist plots that the National Counter-Terrorism Structure can exploit just as the successful terror attacks can show weaknesses within the structure. Lastly, the six events impart crucial details that can likely illuminate the current militant Islamist threat within the United

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

States.

THE CONTEMPORARY MILITANT ISLAMIST THREAT IN THE UNITED STATES: WHY SIX YEARS WITHOUT AN ATTACK?

The future scenario in Columbus, Ohio proposed at the beginning of this paper is valid if there is still a plausible militant Islamist threat to the United States homeland. If such a threat exists, then what is the explanation of the absence of a significant terror attack since 9/11? An examination of five possible explanations will show that a militant Islamist threat still exists and is likely on the most dangerous end of the terror attack spectrum shown in Figure 1. The first two possibilities are that militant Islamists no longer desire or have the capabilities to strike at the US homeland. The third possible reason is that the US Counter-Terrorism structure has stopped every attack since 9/11. Next, it is possible to argue that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have distracted the militant Islamists or have taken all of their attention and capabilities. Lastly, the militant Islamists are planning an attack as powerful as or worse than that of September 11, 2001. The last possibility is the most dangerous and most terrifying.

Although the US Counter-Terrorism structure is more capable than before 9/11 and the wars have siphoned militant Islamist desire and capabilities, the next five sections of this chapter will show that the first four reasons do not fully explain six years without a militant Islamist attack in the homeland. The failure of the first four explanations and support for the fifth will show that there is a militant Islamist threat in the United States and the most dangerous threat is the most likely.

Militant Islamists Have Lost the Desire

This first explanation for the six-year absence of a significant terror attack in the United States is a waning militant Islamist desire to strike in the US homeland. Stated differently, al-Qaeda and its related organizations have grown tired of fighting the United States military around the world and against the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure in the homeland. If Osama

Bin Laden and other Islamic sources are no longer calling for attacks against the United States, then a loss of desire is a valid explanation for the lack of significant terror attacks within the United States.

The truth is that there is no end to the rhetoric from leaders of al-Qaeda and other extremist Islamic terrorist organizations. Many of the calls for attacks, support, or other guidance are specific to a certain location and current events, but many have broad aims to reach a wide intended audience. Osama Bin Laden's *Declaration of Jihad*, also known as his *Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places*, is al-Qaeda's first call to arms for Muslims to join in a jihad against the United States.⁴⁶ He made this declaration because of the US military presence in Saudi Arabia, or the Land of the Two Holy Places. Bin Laden said, "Clearly after Belief (Imaan) there is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land," and "the ultimate aim of pleasing Allah...is to fight the enemy, in every aspect and in a complete manner".⁴⁷ Later Osama Bin Laden gave Muslims further justification to join in the jihad against the Americans when he said, "I say to you William, that these youths love death as you love life," and "Our youths believe in paradise after death."⁴⁸ Although Bin Laden spoke to Americans, his statement applies to Muslims, whether knowledgeable of the Quran or not, that if they were obedient to the will of Allah and if they were lucky enough to be killed in the conduct of their attack, then they will achieve paradise.⁴⁹

In his 1998 *Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders* Osama Bin Laden is even clearer in his urge to Muslims to kill Americans, both civilian and military, anywhere they are found.

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is

⁴⁶ Paul Williams, *Osama's Revenge: the Next 9/11* (Amherst: Prometheus, 2004), 202.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 189.

⁴⁸ Williams, 202. Osama is referring to William Perry, the US Secretary of Defense at the time.

⁴⁹ Qur'an 47:4-6.

possible to do it...in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.⁵⁰

Here, Bin Laden's justification for *jihad* expanded to include calls to kill American civilians as well as military and included any country in which it is possible- not just the Land of the Two Holy Places.⁵¹

After nineteen Muslim men answered Osama Bin Laden's call for *jihad* and launched the attacks on September 11th 2001, he wrote another communiqué. This one, *A Letter to America* is a calm, patient, and thorough answer to a persistent question Americans had been asking, "On what basis are we [al-Qaeda] fighting?"⁵² This communiqué first appeared on November 24, 2002 on Arabic websites and was later translated into English. In his letter, Bin Laden defends al-Qaeda's attacks by stating, "You (America) attacked us in Somalia; ...You steal our wealth and oil... Your forces occupy our countries; ...You have starved Muslims of Iraq."⁵³ These reasons for al-Qaeda's attacks on Americans are only a few that Bin Laden provided in that communiqué. Later, in that same release, he provided an answer to why civilians are justified targets.

The American people are the ones who pay the taxes that fund the planes that bomb us in Afghanistan, the tanks that strike and destroy our homes in Palestine, the armies that occupy our lands..., and the fleets that ensure the blockade of Iraq...the American Army is part of the American people...who employ both their men and their women in the Armed Forces.⁵⁴

His complaints against America and its citizens were evidence that Osama Bin Laden does not consider al-Qaeda's mission complete within the United States. Having explained American civilians are complicit with its military, OBL justified attacks against civilians and cleared the

⁵⁰ Williams, 217.

⁵¹ Qur'an 8:65.

⁵² Robert O. Marlin, *What Does Al-Qaeda Want: Unedited Communiqués* [Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2005], 58.

⁵³ Marlin, 58-62.

⁵⁴ Marlin, 63.

conscience of militant Islamists to conduct attacks within the United States.

In spite of his Islamic religious banter, Osama Bin Laden listed many aspects of American cultural that he called immoral. Usury, gambling, pornography, the sex trade, exploiting women as consumer products, destroying nature, and lastly President Clinton's immoral acts in the Oval Office were all examples OBL used to portray the United States as immoral and spiritually lost.⁵⁵ A devout Muslim and potential militant Islamist could find further justification in Bin Laden's description of America's moral being to conduct attacks within the United States and against its citizens.

The three letters from Osama Bin Laden in the preceding paragraphs are from 1996, 1998, and 2002 respectively and laid the foundation for the *jihad* against America and its citizens. In a more current communiqué, released in September 2007, Osama Bin Laden directed a video message at the people of America. In it, he explained that the main reason why the United States has not won in Iraq or Afghanistan and did not win in Vietnam is because the owners of the major corporations and their cohorts in the government have it in their best interest to continue wars. As in his 2002 letter, OBL claimed that the blood of Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan is on the hands of all Americans who do not convert to Islam. He elaborated how Muslims believe that rabbis and monks altered the Torah and Bible and that only the Qur'an is unaltered and perfect. This Bin Laden correspondence does not explicitly call for Muslims to kill the next American they see, but rather makes an implicit argument for continued *jihad* against the United States because of the ascendancy of Islam and Americans' refusal to submit to its perfect message.⁵⁶ OBL's call for continued jihad simply echoed Muhammad's own words, "Fight them until there

⁵⁵ Williams, 9-12.

⁵⁶ Osama Bin Laden "Transcript of Osama Bin Laden Tape September 2007" MideastWeb Middle East Web Log, <http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000622.htm> [accessed February 11, 2007].

is no more disbelief and worshipping others besides Allah...”⁵⁷ Stephen Coughlin quoted a 12th grade Saudi school textbook concerning jihad continuing, “It is part of God’s wisdom that he made the clash between truth and falsehood continue until the Day of Resurrection.”⁵⁸ Bin Laden reiterated what young Saudis read from their government sanctioned textbooks.

To this point, the only Islamic point of view on the subject of war, or jihad, provided has been Osama Bin Laden’s. Former Pakistani Army Brigadier General S.K. Malik published an important book on jihad in 1979: *The Quranic Concept of War*. General Malik described the Qur’an as “...a source of eternal guidance for mankind...[and that it] gives us a philosophy of war as well”, a divine theory of war doctrine.⁵⁹ In a review of Malik’s book, LTC Joseph Myers called it “a philosophy, or treatise...that attempts to form their thinking about war” and compared the work to Clausewitz’s *On War*.⁶⁰ Two important concepts General Malik defined are jihad and the use of terror. He defined jihad as, “...a continuous and never-ending struggle waged on all fronts including political, economic, social psychological, domestic, moral and spiritual to attain the objectives of policy.”⁶¹ General Malik said, “The Quranic military strategy thus enjoins us to prepare ourselves for war to the utmost in order to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies.” He then sounded as if he was referring to Clausewitz’ concept of center of gravity when he said, “In war, our main objective is the opponent’s heart...Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself.”⁶² For a potential militant Islamist who

⁵⁷ Qur’an 8:39.

⁵⁸ The Freedom House, *Excerpts from Saudi Education Textbooks for Islamic Studies: Arabic with English Translation*, (Center for Religious Freedom of Freedom House with the Institute for Gulf Affairs, Washington, DC, 2006), 104-105, translating Twelfth Grade, *Hadith and Islamic Culture*, Education Development, (Ministry of Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Riyadh), 58-59 quoted in Stephen Coughlin, “‘To Our Great Detriment’: Ignoring What Extremists Say About *Jihad*” (master’s thesis, National Defense Intelligence College, 2007), 11.

⁵⁹ S. K. Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War* [Delhi: Adam Publisher and Distributor, 1992], xxii.

⁶⁰ Joseph C. Myers, “The Quranic Concept of War,” *Parameters* 36, no. 4 (Winter 2006-07), 109.

⁶¹ Malik, 54.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 58-59.

is seeking a more legitimate authority than Osama Bin Laden on the subjects of jihad and terror, Brigadier General Malik, a General Officer in the Army of an Islamic nation-state, provided a justification for both.

The Reliance of the Traveler (Umdat al-Salik in Arabic) written by Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri in 1368 contains explicit instructions for the Muslim concerning their obligations toward jihad:

Jihad is also personally obligatory for everyone able to perform it, male or female, old or young...having entered our territory...for non-Muslim forces entering Muslim lands is a weighty matter that cannot be ignored, but must be met with effort and struggle to repel them by every possible means.⁶³

This classic text of Islam contains nearly as much legitimacy to the Muslim as does the Qur'an; therefore, ibn Naqib's instructions to join jihad carry significant weight in Islam.

Perhaps a potential militant Islamist is seeking more than the interpretations of men concerning *jihad*. In that case, the Qur'an is rife with calls to *jihad* for the Muslim. In addition to the Qur'anic quotes from General Malik on jihad, the following are all from the Qur'an: "Fight them until there is no more (disbelief) and religion is only for Allah..."; "And do not relent in pursuing the enemy."; "Fight and kill the disbelievers wherever you find them, take them captive, harass them, lie in wait and ambush them using every stratagem of war."; and "Fight those who do not believe until they all surrender..."⁶⁴

This section showed that Osama Bin Laden, Brigadier General S.K. Malik, Ahmad ibn Naqib, and the Qur'an all offer direction or justification to strike at the United States; some more explicitly than the others. Therefore, a lack of desire to attack cannot account for the six-year absence of significant terror attacks within the United States.

⁶³ Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, *Umdat al-Salik* (Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law), rev. ed. trans. Nuh Ha Mim Keller (Beltsville: Amana Publications, 1994), Book O "Justice," at o9 "Jihad," at o9.3.

⁶⁴ Qur'an 2:193; 4:104; 9:5; and 9:29. Four quotes were consolidated herein for efficiency.

Militant Islamists no Longer Have the Capability

A lack of sufficient materials to conduct an attack on the scale of 9/11 or greater and the militant Islamist men is a plausible explanation for the lack of a terror attack since 9/11 in the United States. The converse is also true; the availability of willing militant Islamists, either homegrown or from abroad, and the availability of the necessary components for a terror weapon will demonstrate that a lack of capability is not a valid explanation for the six plus years without a significant terror attack within the United States.

Material for Another 9/11 (or worse)

For the fictitious nuclear bomb detonation in Columbus, Ohio at the beginning of this paper to be plausible, a small, easily carried nuclear device and the means of getting the bomb into the country must exist. As for the bomb, former Soviet officials have lost accountability of up to 36 suitcase nuclear devices from Cold War days.⁶⁵ Osama Bin Laden reportedly purchased some of the missing suitcase nukes.⁶⁶ Doubts exist over whether those nuclear devices are functional or that they were suitcase nukes at all.⁶⁷

The 9/11 Commission also provided evidence that militant Islamists may have a nuclear device or other weapon of mass destruction (WMD): “Our report shows that al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten years. There is no doubt the United States would be a prime target.”⁶⁸ Their research also named the US homeland as the destination for a militant Islamist WMD. If militant Islamists have a functional suitcase nuclear device or other type of WMD, it could be smuggled from Canada across Lake Erie through American-

⁶⁵ Williams, 38-49.

⁶⁶ Marlin, 39-43.

⁶⁷ James Foley, “U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Monday, March 23, 1998,” Department of State, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9803/980323db.html> (Accessed March 31, 2008).

Indian territory in New York.⁶⁹ Mr. Flynn's smuggling of the weapon from Canada ignored the porous US border with Mexico. Once the device was inside the United States, the Columbus, Ohio nuclear detonation scenario is feasible.

If a nuclear attack in the United States was deemed unrealistic, then consider moving down the Terror Attack Spectrum to a dirty bomb. The increased availability of radioactive material and its easier smuggling would make for a more plausible scenario. *America the Vulnerable* described the collection of readily available radiological material over several years from former hospital equipment and other publicly accessible areas.⁷⁰ One Department of Homeland Security Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Joint Analysis Center report listed three separate seizures of radioactive material from unapproved individuals just in the month of November 2007.⁷¹ The same report showed ten other radioactive material seizures in the eleven months prior to the November report and 658 seizures of radioactive material, including seventeen weapons-scale material, since 1977.⁷²

Militant Islamists can acquire radioactive material for a dirty bomb from either discarded legitimate equipment, as described by Mr. Flynn, or from illegal nuclear weapon or energy trafficking, as described in the DNDO report. Smuggling of radioactive material would be easier than smuggling an assembled bomb, especially a nuclear device, because it can easily be spread inside other objects. Nuclear devices or nuclear material are realistically available, but there must be militant Islamist men inside the United States willing to carry out such an attack.

⁶⁸ Kean and Hamilton, 399.

⁶⁹ Flynn, 25.

⁷⁰ Flynn, 17-35.

⁷¹ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, *Open Source Reporting: Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radiological Materials* (Los Alamos National Laboratory: Nuclear Assessment Program, November 2007), 3-7.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 11.

Militant Islamists for the Next Terror Attack

There are people around the world who would do harm to the United States; fifteen minutes spent listening to a news program or reading CNN.com makes that an obvious fact. Of the six terror plots and attacks described earlier, some or all the militant Islamists were from abroad.⁷³ All of the 1993 World Trade Center and 9/11 attackers were from overseas, came to the United States, stayed for months or years, and planned and executed their attacks. Richard Reid, the so-called shoe bomber, was from England. Ahmed Ressam, the failed Los Angeles Airport attacker in 1999, was from Algeria. Kamal Derwish, the spiritual leader who helped radicalize the other seven men from the Lackawanna militant Islamist cell was a Saudi citizen. Habis Saoub, born in Jordan, was the leader of the Portland Seven militant Islamist cell. All six men involved in the plot to attack Fort Dix soldiers were foreign-born men, some of whom lived in the United States for years before becoming radicalized to militant Islam. All were foreign men who executed, or attempted to execute attacks, within or enroute to the United States.

If militant Islamists can no longer enter the United States, the previous events are irrelevant. Unfortunately, the borders with Canada and Mexico offer little hindrance to militant Islamists who wish to enter the United States. FBI director Robert Mueller, Jr. concurred when he revealed that, "individuals from countries with known al-Qaeda connections have attempted to enter the United States illegally using alien smuggling rings and assuming Hispanic appearances."⁷⁴ Congressman J.D. Hayworth from Arizona estimated that border guards along the US-Mexico border catch one in four people illegally entering the United States into

⁷³ The term "from abroad" refers to non-US citizens seeking to enter the United States in order to conduct a terrorist attack and may include or those who have lived or worked within the country for an extended period of time.

⁷⁴ Oliver North, "Back Door to Terror," Fox News, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,222897,00.html> (Accessed March 31, 2008).

Arizona.⁷⁵ Of those entering the country, not all are from Canada and Mexico. In 2004, as many as 190,000 people from countries like Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, and Iraq entered the United States.⁷⁶ That list of countries should make any American who is concerned about the defense of the homeland take notice.

Many conservative politicians advocate putting a fence along the US-Mexico border to keep those illegally entering the country out or at least funnel them to checkpoints. While a fence may make sense from a homeland security standpoint, it has significant political and cultural implications challenges. In October 2006, President Bush signed a bill that paid for 698 miles of fence on the US-Mexico border. Those 698 miles plus the 75 already completed south of San Diego, California will be less than 40% of the 2,000-mile long border.⁷⁷ Because of the significant cost of portion already completed and the Democratic Party in control of Congress, the fence will likely never be completed.

Militant Islamists are not only coming to the United States from abroad, some come from within the US. These homegrown militant Islamists are radicalized US citizens and long-term residents who are willing to attack their own nation.⁷⁸ This chapter has already revealed several US citizens or long-term residents who have become homegrown militant Islamists: The Lackawanna Six had five US-born members, the Portland Seven had six members who were born in the United States, and the Fort Dix plot had the Duka brothers who lived in the United States their whole lives.

One homegrown militant Islamist not discussed yet is Adam Gadahn, also known as the “American al-Qaeda.” Born in the United States, Gadahn became a radical follower of Islam and

⁷⁵ J.D. Hayworth, *Whatever It Takes* (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2006), 1.

⁷⁶ Donald L. Barlett and James Steele, “Who Left the Door Open?,” *Time*, September 20, 2004.

⁷⁷ Fred Burton, “Tactical Implications of a Border Fence,” *Stratfor*, May 24, 2006.

⁷⁸ The term “homegrown” threat refers to US citizens or long time residents that subscribe to militant Islam and are indoctrinated to believe they should conduct an attack within the United States or

left the country. He made a video in December 2007 where he tears up his US passport, renounces his US citizenship, and calls President Bush, “butcher Bush.”⁷⁹ Gadahn is on the FBI’s Most Wanted List and he has a \$1 million reward for information leading to his capture. He has been charged with treason, the first US-citizen since World War II. “Gadahn...embraced Islam in the mid-1990s and moved to Pakistan.” [and] “...has appeared in at least eight al-Qaeda videos...”⁸⁰ Gadahn and the men described at the beginning of this chapter are just a sampling of long-term residents and US citizens who chose radical Islam and militant Islamism. Unfortunately, the United States plays a significant role in aiding militant Islamist recruiting.

Feeding the Hand that Bites You

Messages and videos from Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri as well as Brigadier General Malik’s book and Qur’anic verses about jihad are all important in the recruiting of Muslims, but the United States can do little to counter them. The United States can control its own actions and strategic message; therefore, it is crucial to recognize and minimize unintended support the United States gives to militant Islamist recruiting. The existence of the US military in Muslim nations, Muslim mistreatment in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, United States support to Israel, and speeches from US leaders could all potentially push non-violent Muslims toward militant Islamism. Analyzing the roles of those factors the United States can control is important.

Islam began in the Arabian Peninsula with Arabs as the founders and its first converts. According to Muslims, the angel Gabriel dictated the Qur’an in Arabic, which became the language of Islam as it spread throughout the Middle East.⁸¹ Because of the Arabic roots of the

against its citizens.

⁷⁹ CNN, “Tape: American al-Qaeda member renounces citizenship,” CNN.com, <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/01/06/gadahn.tape/index.html#cnnSTCText> (accessed February 15, 2008).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind* [New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002], 85.

Qur'an and Islam, the Arab cultural identity influences Muslims anywhere in the world to some degree. Two important characteristics of the Arab cultural identity that influence militant Islamist recruiting today are honor and revenge. In Arabic culture, if a member of a group is killed, then "Revenge is called for, which becomes the duty of all the male members of the victim's kin group (*khamisa* in Arabic)." ⁸² This could be relevant to an understanding of the relationship between militant Islamist recruiting and the actions of the US military. Muslim men who have lost relatives to real or perceived US actions are more susceptible to militant Islamism than someone who has not lost relatives. A second Arab cultural component that is important with respect to militant Islamist recruiting is honor (*sharaf* in Arabic). "Honorable behavior is that which is conducive to group cohesion and group survival." ⁸³ Honor relates to revenge because "Cost what it may, one must defend one's public image. Any injury done to a man's honor must be revenged, or else he becomes permanently dishonored." ⁸⁴ In 2004, US planes attacked an Iraqi wedding celebration near the Syrian border and killed "27 members of Rikad Nayef's extended family died and most of them were children and women." ⁸⁵ According to the Arab cultural characteristics of revenge and honor, the Nayef family is justified in seeking to kill their attackers, the Americans. Militant Islamists could have used the incident to recruit members of Nayef family, clan, and tribe, well beyond the *khamisa*.

Arab revenge and honor are powerful tools when the militant Islamist recruiters can use incidents like the Nayef wedding bombing, but what happens when a US atrocity offends an entire national identity or all of Islam? The Abu Ghraib scandal and the long-term incarceration

⁸² Raphael Patai, 85. *Khamisa* means all the male relatives who are removed from the victim by no more than five male links.

⁸³ Patai, 95.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 96.

⁸⁵ Scheherezade Faramarzi, "Iraqis: Wedding video captures revelers; U.S.: Target was safe-house," USAToday.com, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-05-23-wedding-tape_x.htm (accessed March 2, 2008).

of Muslims at Guantanamo enraged Muslims far beyond the family unit. Militant Islamists can use incidents like these to incite outrage against US military and to demand revenge against Americans.⁸⁶ Militant Islam recruiting is easier overseas where US troops can inadvertently dishonor men or trigger a cry for revenge by accidentally killing Muslim non-combatants. In Iraq or Afghanistan, the United States military creates more militant Islamists than they pacify, capture, or kill.

Beyond the instances where direct US actions have dishonored Muslims, the politics of the United States can provide additional fuel for militant Islamist recruiters. US support for Israel during its conflict with Lebanon in 2006 is seen in Europe as serving to radicalize Arab populations against Western interests.⁸⁷ Any actions seen as alignment with those of Israel can be inflammatory to Muslims and is fodder for recruiting Muslims for militant Islamism. President Bush provided additional recruiting material when in a speech on July 2, 2003, he said "...bring them on" urging "anybody who wants to harm American troops" to attack them in Iraq.⁸⁸ Militant Islamist recruiters, to show that the leader of the Americans is inciting Muslims to attack his soldiers in Iraq, could use that speech and others like it.

The Internet and satellite television not only transmit militant Islamist messages, images, and rhetoric but also the actions of the US military and speeches by US leaders, which makes all those actions accessible to Muslims in the United States and around the world.⁸⁹ Those media are significant to militant Islamist recruiting when considering the Iraqi wedding bombing, the Abu Ghraib Muslim mistreatment scandal, the holding of Muslim men at Guantanamo Bay without

⁸⁶ Patai, 96.

⁸⁷ Roula Khalaf, "US policy in the Middle east Unravels," FT.com (Financial Times), Aug 4, 2006, <http://www.ft.com> (accessed February 15, 2008).

⁸⁸ Associated Press, "Bush: 'Bring on' attackers of U.S. troops," [usatoday.com](http://www.usatoday.com), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-07-02-bush-iraq-troops_x.htm (accessed February 15, 2008).

⁸⁹ Internet is capitalized within this paper when it is the proper name of the worldwide web and not the verb to connect separate networks in communications language.

access to a trial or due process, and President Bush's speeches. Images of naked, hooded, tortured Muslim men, bravado from President Bush, and the existence of US troops in two Muslim nations dishonors Muslims and can incite them to join in *jihad*.

This section showed that militant Islamists have ample men and material for another terror attack and that the United States is often an unintentional partner in militant Islamist recruiting. These facts mean that militant Islamists have the capability to conduct a 9/11-like attack; ergo, this is not a plausible explanation for the six and a half years without a significant terror attack in the United States.

The Good Guys Got Them All

The US National Counter-Terrorism Structure, made up of federal, state, and local police and homeland defense organizations, has thwarted nineteen terrorist attacks that are public knowledge (three of which were discussed in previously) within the United States since September 11, 2001.⁹⁰ There has not been a successful militant Islamist attack on US soil that is comparable to the scope of the attacks on 9/11. Perhaps all the gaps in the Counter-Terrorism Structure that existed before 9/11 are fixed and it is no longer possible to launch an attack of that magnitude. This sounds like a reasonable explanation for the fact that for six years there has not been a terror attack on the scale of 9/11. This section will show that in spite of the impressive work by the US Counter-Terrorism Structure, a significant terror attack is still likely inside the United States.

In sports, some victories come when you win and some come when your opponent's mistakes loses the game for them. Put in the context of the war between militant Islamists and

⁹⁰ James Jay Carafano, "U.S. Thwarts 19 Terrorist Attacks Against America Since 9/11," The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg2085.cfm> (accessed March 2, 2008). The author wrote this article on November 13, 2007 and acknowledged his list only includes publicly known (not classified SECRET) plots.

the US Counter-Terrorism Structure, the United States won in some of the nineteen terrorist efforts, but the rest the militant Islamists lost. Three of the historical events from this chapter are examples of this situation. In the case of the Lackawanna Six, the FBI benefited from the fact that, although the cell had made it to an Afghanistan terror training camp, four from the cell left training early and returned to the United States. It seems their "...exposure to militant jihad at a stage in their radicalization before they had yet to fully be indoctrinated in a holy warrior...mindset may have impeded their progression to the jihadization stage."⁹¹ The FBI would not have even been aware of the cell's existence if not for the anonymous note delivered to the FBI office in Buffalo. Although the Lackawanna Six counts as a win for the US Counter-Terrorism Structure, it came more by way of a militant Islamist loss than by their own win.

Another example of a militant Islamist *loss* was when the Portland Seven attempted to get to Afghanistan by way of China without the proper travel papers. Had the Chinese military not stopped them from entering Pakistan, those men would have been fighting US Soldiers in Afghanistan.⁹² The situation with the Portland Seven points to militant Islamist mistakes that led to the counter-terror win.

Those plotting to attack Fort Dix took the video cassette of their firing weapons and chanting jihad to a public vendor to convert it to a DVD format, thereby making quite public their plans for attack.⁹³ These three examples show that the potential attackers were amateurish and unprepared. Without a bit of luck and mistakes from the militant Islamists involved, the plots may have succeeded. Eventually the militant Islamists may stop committing errors and the Counter-Terrorism Structure *win* will rely upon their own abilities to find and stop the threat in

⁹¹ Silber and Bhatt, 62.

⁹² Ibid., 63.

⁹³ Dale Russakoff and Dan Eggen, "Six Charged in Plot To Attack Fort Dix," *washingtonpost.com*, , <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/08/AR2007050800465.html> (accessed February 13, 2008).

time.

Muslim men, both homegrown and from abroad, are available for militant Islamist use within the United States. All of the attackers in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 9/11 attacks were foreign-born. Even since September 11th, 2001 Kamal Derwish, Habis Saoub, and all six men from the Fort Dix plot were from abroad. Because these foreign militant Islamists were inside the United States, the US Counter-Terrorism Structure responsible for border security has failed. The radicalization of US citizens does not mean that the Counter-Terrorism Structure watching militant Islamist recruiting is not succeeding. That is because, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the Counter-Terrorism Structure cannot watch US citizens and does not have the resources to watch 300 million citizens if it could. Although homegrown militant Islamists have not yet conducted a successful terror attack within the United States, it is alarming that they are unknown until after radicalization. Militant Islamists, from abroad or homegrown, can operate within the United States for months or years as long as they do not come up on any law enforcement or counter-terror radar.⁹⁴

The Counter-Terrorism Structure has successfully disrupted many terror plots since 9/11. It is also likely that the US public is unaware of many more thwarted plots. The arguments offered to this point propose that a successful terror attack remains possible, even with the improved Counter-Terrorism Structure. It is also possible that it has simply been lucky or worse is being deceived into believing an attack on the scale of those of September 11, 2001 is not being planned and coordinated. For these reasons, the improvement of the Counter-Terrorism Structure cannot properly explain the six and a half years of peace in the United States.

⁹⁴ David Cudmore, FBI Special Agent from the Kansas City, Missouri FBI office, interview by author, Kansas City, MO, February 7, 2008.

Bright, Shiny Object

Another explanation for the six and a half year terror attack gap in the United States asserts that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan draw militant Islamists from around the world to those two countries, limiting their availability to fight elsewhere. In other words, the bright, shiny wars in Asia are distracting militant Islamist terror attack planning and coordinating in the United States. President Bush stated that, "...he is determined to keep U.S. troops in Iraq as he says it is better to fight terrorists abroad than to fight them at home."⁹⁵ Few Americans would argue that it is better to fight the enemy abroad; however, one interpretation of the President's statement is that he has ignored the possibility that the United States may have to fight both abroad **and** at home simultaneously.

Even while the wars overseas are ongoing, previous sections have shown that militant Islamists are entering the United States and are being homegrown. Because of the US military presence in those Muslim nations, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are creating more enemies than are defeating. If the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have truly distracted the militant Islamists, then the rhetoric from Islamic sources would preclude the United States. Statements and writings from Osama Bin Laden, Brigadier General Malik, the Qur'an, and Umdat al-Salik do not say anything of the sort.

The evidence presented in this chapter has shown that militant Islamist attention and resources are not completely distracted from attacking the United States. Therefore, the bright and shiny objects of Iraq and Afghanistan cannot sufficiently explain the six and a half years without a significant terror attack in the United States.

⁹⁵ Scott Stearns, "Bush: Troops in Iraq Make America Safer," GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2006/08/iraq-060819-voa01.htm> (accessed February 14, 2008).

9/11 or Worse is the Most Likely

It is not enough to have shown that the first four explanations are incapable of properly explaining the six years of peace within the United States; this section will show that the reason for that period of peace is that the militant Islamists are planning an attack as damaging as those on September 11, 2001, or worse.

There are two reasons that the next terror attack in the United States will be on the more violent end of the Threat Spectrum shown in Figure 1. The first is that the next attack must have a *shock factor* in order to play well in the Muslim world while doing maximum damage to the United States.⁹⁶ The second is that terror attacks on the less violent end of the Spectrum are relatively easy to carry out and have been well within current militant Islamist capabilities since September 11th.

Support for the first hypothesis comes from al-Qaeda themselves. They considered an agro-terrorism attack during their pre-9/11 planning, but chose the use of commercial airplanes as weapons, because the latter had more of the aforementioned *shock factor*.⁹⁷ The proposed attack needed to do the most damage to the US economy, infrastructure, and, most importantly, the American psyche. An agro-terror attack would do tremendous damage to the US economy, but would lack the visual shock that commercial airplanes, ones that any American might have been on, flying into American landmarks could do. Attacks toward the least damaging end of the spectrum, for example a kid-napping or shooting rampage, may damage the American psyche, but would likely affect the economy and infrastructure very little. Future militant Islamist recruitment depends on successful terror attacks; success breeds success. Therefore, the next militant Islamist attack will be on par with the attacks on September 11, 2001 or be worse.

Appendix 2 at the end of this paper is another potential future scenario where Russia

⁹⁶ **NEED FOOTNOTE HERE. GOT THIS IDEA FROM DR. ABS!!!!**

attacks the United States. That scenario uses forms of attack that militant Islamists could use today and have had access to since 9/11. The shootings in the Nebraska Mall and on the Virginia Tech campus, if carried out by militant Islamists instead of US citizens, show that terror attacks on the left end of the Terror Spectrum are possible. The DC Snipers, John Muhammad and Lee Malvo, killed ten people in autumn 2002 and both were militant Islamists.⁹⁸ The militant Islamists from the Portland Seven and the plot to attack Fort Dix also had access to small arms. Militant Islamist access to small arms weaponry and Osama Bin Laden's calls for Muslims to kill Americans anywhere possible combined with the US vulnerability to this type of attack should have yielded far more militant Islamists attacks in the United States than just the Muhammad and Malvo attacks.⁹⁹ There must be a reason for the lack of attacks.

If militant Islamists are in the United States plotting the next spectacular terror attack, then they are quietly coexisting within and around the Counter-Terrorism Structure designed to stop them. In order to patiently plan and prepare for the next attack, the militant Islamists would benefit from distractions to the Counter-Terrorism Structure. One possible means for that would be for other militant Islamists to be caught preparing or executing a terror attack. Perhaps the failed terror plots within the United States since 9/11 discussed thus far were part of a deception plan. In this possible scenario, the militant Islamists threw the "games" in order to keep the US citizens and the Counter-Terrorism Structure distracted from a real terror attack. The failed plots, aka the militant Islamist deception plan, would boost American morale and the confidence of the Counter-Terrorism Structure. The longer the militant Islamists take to plan, the greater the American hubris will become and the more the Counter-Terrorism Structure would let its guard down.

⁹⁷ NEED FOOTNOTE HERE.

⁹⁸ Robert Spencer, "Malkin: how the media got the snipers' jihad all wrong December 10, 2003," JihadWatch.com, <http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/000388.php> (accessed March 30, 2008).

After six and a half years of removing their shoes and hearing about “elevated threat levels,” the average American is growing weary and will soon demand proof a real threat on par with those of 9/11 still exists. In a situation of increasing threat-weariness, militant Islamists, men who studied the details and flaws of previous terror attack plans, could be patiently and meticulously planning and executing the next spectacular attack. Although this explanation may not be as plausible as the one in the previous paragraph, it is a possible explanation for the six year gap in terror attacks here in the United States.

Using only readily available weapons militant Islamists could carry out attacks similar to those of the Virginia Tech shooter, the Nebraska mall shooter, or the Washington DC sniper duo. The militant Islamists have reasons to avoid attacks of that sort in order to remain out of sight for their planning of the next spectacular terror attacks.

Summary of the Threat

Militant Islamists have declared war on the United States. Their message, rooted in the Qur'an and espoused by Osama Bin Laden, delivered via the Internet or satellite television to Muslims all over the world, urges them to attack the United States and that it is all right to kill Americans in any country in which you are able. The militant Islamist threat exists within the United States. Many militant Islamists penetrate our borders and others are homegrown right under the nose of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure designed to prevent the next terrorist attack. The US-led wars in Muslim lands, aggressive militant Islamist recruiting, and strategic errors by the US leadership all aid in continuing the steady stream of willing adherents to the militant Islamist cause ready to strike at the United States homeland. The militant Islamist attacks and plots since 9/11, as well as their continued successful recruiting, show that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan do not distract them. The militant Islamist threat has access to the materials

⁹⁹ Williams, 217.

to strike at the United States across the terror attack spectrum (Figure 1) and they have had over six years to plan an attack on the more damaging end of that spectrum. One thing is certain, the United States is still vulnerable to another militant Islamist terrorist attack. The potent militant Islamist message, availability of terror materials and willing militant Islamists, and the time to plan and maneuver all point to another terror attack on the scale of 9/11 or greater inside the United States.

DESCRIPTION OF THE NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRUCTURE

Based on the description of the threat, the United States, more specifically the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure, is at war with militant Islamists inside the homeland. Although, some do not call this conflict a war, but four important authorities do. Leaders from both sides of the conflict, the President of the United States and the head of al-Qaeda, describe it as war. Two authors of future war concepts and an important classical war theorist have hypothetical and theoretical definitions for war that support the assertion that the United States and militant Islamists are at war in the US homeland.

Four Votes to Call It War

After the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, President George Bush said that, “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”¹⁰⁰ The terror attacks conducted, attempted, or planned within the United States on 9/11 and since then are similar or identical to those conducted in Iraq and elsewhere around the globe. Because President Bush refers to US counter-militant Islamist actions abroad within the context of war, those same actions inside the United States are also war; therefore, his definitions of war fit the current conflict within the

¹⁰⁰ George Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” Whitehouse.

homeland. The US National Counter-Terrorism Structure and militant Islamist conflict is a war according to Osama Bin Laden. We have already seen that Osama Bin Laden has repeatedly called for jihad against the United States. To the followers of Islam ‘*jihad*’ means holy war; therefore, militant Islamists refer to this conflict as war.¹⁰¹

In 1999, Qiao Lang and Wang Ziangsui, two young Chinese Army Colonels, conceptualized future war as one through which a weaker nation could wage *unrestricted warfare* against a stronger one. Qiao and Wang go on to describe the new form of warfare as;

...transcend[ing] all boundaries and limits...It means that all weapons and technology can be superimposed at will, it means that all the boundaries lying between the two worlds of war and non-war, of military and non-military, will be totally destroyed, and it also means that many of the current principles of combat will be modified, and even that the rules of war may need to be rewritten.¹⁰²

If a weaker nation or non-national militant Islamist ideology wanted to wage war against the United States, they could use *unrestricted warfare* to do so. The authors list methods for warfare operations that include those previously used for terror purposes as well as others not yet attempted but have potential terror uses.¹⁰³ The unrestricted warfare methods Qiao and Wang described are not strictly Chinese or Asian in nature; they transcend cultures and are applicable to the militant Islamist way of war. The authors’ classification of acts of terrorism as war and their both being military officers in the Chinese, a major world military power, is further support for calling the conflict between the US Counter-Terrorism Structure and militant Islamists war.

Finally, the classic war theorist, Carl von Clausewitz wrote in *On War*, “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”¹⁰⁴ Since the militant Islamists are attempting to

Gov, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> [accessed March 4, 2008].

¹⁰¹ David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* [Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005], 1.

¹⁰² Qiao Lang and Wang Xiangusi, *Unrestricted Warfare*, [Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999], 12.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 146.

¹⁰⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, [Princeton: Princeton, 1989], 75.

impose their will upon the United States, we are at *war* with them. Osama Bin Laden's calls for jihad against the United States in order to force the US military out of Muslim holy lands is an example of their attempt to force the US to do their will.

Like previous conflicts in United States history, the current conflict between the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure and militant Islamists does not have a declared state of war from the United States Congress. However, leaders from both sides of the conflict, two Army Colonels from a neutral nation, and war theory all classify the current conflict as a war. When analyzing the conduct and effectiveness of adversaries within a war, there are important principles to question the conduct and the effectiveness of the adversaries. It is important to keep in mind which side is able to keep and exploit the initiative; thus putting the other perpetually in a reactionary mode. Another important concept is the concentration of the adversaries' combat forces. Do they allocate a minimum of combat resources to secondary efforts in order to concentrate combat forces at the decisive place at the right time? Do they allocate their forces to protect themselves from surprise, interference, and sabotage? Which side has clear leadership channels with a unity of effort under one commander who will ensure their side develops clear, uncomplicated plans; maintains the will to persevere; and that they remain committed to attain their goals?

Purpose and Key Tasks of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure

The purpose of the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure is to prevent and deter a militant Islamist attack within the United States. To counter their militant Islamist adversary effectively, the National Counter-Terrorism Structure must present an integrated defense from the federal to the local level. Federal agencies must cooperate and share information with state and local law enforcement and homeland security organizations. Three key areas or guideposts describe the National Counter-Terrorism Structure: policy, procedure, and resource implementation; communications and information sharing; and contingency plans and rehearsals.

These three areas are the most important because they provide the critical basis and most critical tasks to stop the threat.

Figure 2 illustrates the US Counter-Terrorism Structure connectivity of the different federal, state, and local counter-terror organizations and the information flow between them. In its original document, *Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Implementation Plan*, the figure was labeled “Approved Guideline 2 Framework” and it depicted the “collaborative structure through which terrorism information is shared among participating Federal, [state, local, tribal], and private sector organizations...”¹⁰⁵ The only modifications to the figure are the additions of the four Department of Homeland Security subordinate organizations and the inclusion of NORTHCOM (abbreviated as NC in the figure) in the Department of Defense (DoD) block.




Figure 2 - US Counter-Terrorism Structure¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ PM-ISE, *Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Implementation Plan*, [Washington: Director of National Intelligence, 2006], 71. Although the figure deals specifically with the Information Sharing Environment, it shows all of the organizations and levels within the Counter-Terrorism Structure contained in this paper.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

Policy, Procedure, and Resource Implementation

In order to have a unified vision for success for the entire US National Counter-Terrorism Structure, clear and constant guidance must be available. The guidance comes in the form of laws and policy from the United States Executive and Legislative branches of government. Although, these two branches of government are not part of the Counter-Terrorism Structure as entities, their influence over it is tremendous. It was the President who directed the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the National Counterterrorism Center, and changes to the organization of the FBI and Congress that passed the laws that enacted those crucial ideas. The publishing of national strategic documents like the “National Strategy to Combat Terrorism” and the “National Strategy for Information Sharing,” both important policy documents that affect the entire Counter-Terrorism Structure are products of Executive branch.

The annual national budgets that include funding for all homeland security initiatives and operations at all levels of the Counter-Terrorism Structure are introduced and passed at the federal level. Without sufficient funding state and local counter-terror efforts must use their own, often limited, budgets to purchase required equipment upgrades and pay salaries of the additional personnel required to secure important infrastructure within their area of responsibility.

Communication and Information Sharing in the Counter-Terrorism Structure

Robust communication and information sharing between the different organizations and various levels within the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure is crucial to counter future militant Islamist threats within the United States. This discussion pertains to both the collaboration and sharing of information about the threat and the hardware, or architecture, over which threat information is communicated and secured.

Much has been made of the information sharing problems between the CIA and the FBI before the events of September 11, 2001. Since then, the addition of collaboration cells at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), and fusion

centers have improved information sharing and cooperation within the National Counter-Terrorism Structure.¹⁰⁷ The NCTC, established in 2004, is a strictly federal level collaboration cell under the Director of National Intelligence that “Lead[s] the USG in Counterterrorism Intelligence and Strategic Operational Planning in order to combat the terrorist threat to the US and its interests.”¹⁰⁸ JTTFs, an FBI entity, existed prior to 9/11, but in limited numbers and with few government or law enforcement agencies besides the FBI represented within them. After 9/11, a JTTF was created or expanded within every FBI field office in the country.¹⁰⁹ They now are a crucial information sharing and collaboration hub with federal, state, county, and local law enforcement and homeland security representation. The JTTF passes intelligence about current or potential militant Islamist threats within the JTTF and between the organizations that require the information.¹¹⁰ Working at much the same level of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure as JTTFs are fusion centers, scaled down versions of the JTTF concept. Figure 2 shows that both JTTFs and fusion centers operate at the state level and coordinate with federal, state, and local law organizations. The differences between the two are that the JTTF is a federal-led entity that reports to through the FBI and the Department of Justice, while the fusion center is a state-led entity that interacts with the Department of Homeland Security. Most states now have fusion centers where state, county, city, tribal, and private sector law enforcement and security offices collaborate on threats in their area of responsibility.

It is not enough to have constant and useful communication between the organizations of the US Counter-Terrorism Structure. Communications about potential threats must be clear,

¹⁰⁷ Figure 2 shows the NCTC, JTTF, and fusion center as well as the law enforcement and homeland security organizations that coordinate and share information within each.

¹⁰⁸ NCTC, “About the National Counterterrorism Center,” National Counterterrorism Center, http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html (accessed April 17, 2008).

¹⁰⁹ PM-ISE, *Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Implementation Plan*, [Washington: Director of National Intelligence, 2006], 71.

¹¹⁰ David Cudmore, FBI Special Agent from the Kansas City, Missouri FBI office, interview by

timely, secure, and with a high level of trust between the organizations. The Department of Defense uses a term, information security (INFOSEC), to describe:

The protection and defense of information and information systems against unauthorized access or modification of information, whether in storage, processing, or transit...Information security includes those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats. Information security is composed of computer security and communications security.¹¹¹

INFOSEC conceals friendly written and spoken words and data that may give the adversary an advantage. If the adversary knows the extent to which the US counter-terror organizations know his communications and actions, then he gains or maintains the advantage. Keeping the adversary blind to US plans and information maintains the advantage for friendly organizations.

Federal agencies have the capability to secure voice, data, and email communications internal to their organizations and between them.¹¹² Problems occur when federal agencies have a requirement to communicate securely with state or local organizations. The DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is the DHS web-based information analysis and sharing network that is supposed to “strengthen the real-time, exchange of secure threat information to state and local” and has “low-cost, 24/7 connectivity, end-to-end encrypted communications, secure e-mail, [and an] interactive collaboration tool” among its capabilities.¹¹³ Every state level organization responded that they had and used a secure communications capability, but only two of the eleven mentioned having connectivity to the HSIN.¹¹⁴ At the local level, few cities and counties that supplied completed surveys did not have secure communications with other counter-terror organizations. Of the cities and counties that replied that their organization did have secure

author, Kansas City, MO, February 7, 2008.

¹¹¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics* [Washington: Department of the Army, 2004], 1-99.

¹¹² David Cudmore, interview by author, Kansas City, MO, February 7, 2008.

¹¹³ DHS, “Fact Sheet: Homeland Security Information Network” Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0418.shtm [accessed February 26, 2008].

¹¹⁴ State survey responses January-March 2008.

communications, their responses made it clear that they did not understand the question or the definition of secure communications.

Learning Organizations: Wargaming and Readiness Exercises

The wargaming or testing of an organization's planning documents is the third area of emphasis for the National Counter-Terrorism Structure. The Department of Defense has contingency plans (CONPLANS) prepared for possible conflicts, disasters, and other events. Updates to these CONPLANS occur on a recurring basis and are tested using wargames or exercises to ensure they are valid, updated, and address the issue accordingly. CONPLANS are not restricted to conflict scenarios or the military; many federal, state, and local organizations have plans prepared for natural disasters, influenza outbreaks, and terrorism scenarios. The surveys that were sent to states, counties, and cities asked whether their organization conducted readiness exercises to ensure their internal counter-terror contingency plans are up to date, adequate, and covered the full spectrum of possible threats in their area of responsibility. The state survey also asked if the state conducted readiness exercises and checks of subordinate organization counter-terror contingency plans to ensure they are up to date, adequate, and covered the full spectrum of possible threats in their area of responsibility.

Composition of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure

To this point, references to the United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure were as a monolithic block with no components or separate functions. The next section presents the structure and responsibilities at the federal, state, and local levels. The presentation only includes those organizations designed to prevent the next militant Islamist terror attack within the United States.¹¹⁵ The Counter-Terrorism Structure encompasses dozens of governmental agencies and

¹¹⁵ Stated differently, this paper will not examine any organizations whose missions focus

departments; this paper focuses on the most important to counter-terrorism.

Federal Level

At the federal level, the three organizations examined are the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from the Department of Justice; and Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the newest Combatant Command Headquarters within the DoD. They are the most important because they provide the foundation to the defense of the United States homeland as their primary responsibility.¹¹⁶ Other US federal government agencies contribute to the nation's defense, but this is not their primary mission.

President George Bush established the Department of Homeland Security, the newest of the fifteen Executive departments of the federal government, when he signed H.R. 5005 on November 25, 2002.¹¹⁷ The Department as it exists today contains twenty-five assistant secretary offices; four of which are included in Figure 1 above. Those four offices- The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the US Coast Guard (USCG), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)- have as their primary responsibilities to "secure America" and "prevent and deter terrorist attacks" listed within the mission statement for the Department:

We will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants

predominantly *after* a successful terror attack and will not examine any organizations that do not address counter-terrorism as one of its primary missions.

¹¹⁶ For the mission statements for the three organizations, see FBI, "About Us – Quick Facts," Federal Bureau of Investigation, <http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm> (Accessed February 02, 2008); NORTHCOM, "About USNORTHCOM," Northern Command, <http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html> [accessed February 25, 2008]; and DHS, "Strategic Plan: Securing Our Homeland," DHS, <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/strategicplan/index.shtm> [accessed February 26, 2008].

¹¹⁷ DHS Press Secretary, "President's Remarks at Homeland Security Bill Signing," Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0073.shtm [accessed February 26, 2008].

and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.¹¹⁸

Within the DHS, the worst-case scenario is the basis for threat assessments and facts are simply the starting point for planning and wargaming.¹¹⁹ The FBI bases their assessments of threats or crimes on facts with a conviction in mind. The information flow between the DHS and the FBI is created by the latter's sending assessments based on the facts and data resulting from its threat investigations and the DHS's sending assessments based on its planning and wargaming.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was established in 1908 and is the primary federal law enforcement and counter-terror agency within the United States. The FBI

...plays a key role in fighting terrorism. It is the focal point for intelligence, not only from around the country, but from the CIA and various countries overseas. [It] analyzes [intelligence information], and sends it to field offices, state and municipal police departments, and other federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security.¹²⁰

This quote emphasized the FBI's important role within the US Counter-Terrorism Structure, but the FBI also is the lead federal law enforcement agency within the United States. In both its counter-terror and law enforcement roles the FBI uses intelligence information to make assessments based more on facts than on hypothetical situations or wargaming different scenarios to find the worst-case possibilities. That criterion is crucial for the FBI to make a successful case against a potential criminal or militant Islamist.¹²¹ Figure 2 shows that the FBI falls under the Department of Justice (DoJ) and that JTTFs are an FBI entity.

United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was activated on October 1, 2002 at

¹¹⁸ DHS, "Strategic Plan: Securing Our Homeland," Department of Homeland Security, <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/strategicplan/index.shtm> [accessed February 26, 2008].

¹¹⁹ David Cudmore, interview by author, Kansas City, MO, February 7, 2008.

¹²⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Facts and Figures," The Federal Bureau of Investigation, <http://www.fbi.gov/priorities/priorities.htm> (Accessed February 2, 2008). This citation explicitly mentions that intelligence is shared with the CIA; perhaps as a result of the intelligence failures before the 9/11 terror attacks.

¹²¹ David Cudmore, FBI Special Agent from the Kansas City, Missouri FBI office, interview by author, Kansas City, MO, February 7, 2008.

Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. Its mission states that the Command “anticipates and conducts Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.”¹²² The area of responsibility for NORTHCOM includes the land and airspace over the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, and Mexico as well as the Gulf of Mexico and the seas surrounding those areas out to approximately 500 miles.¹²³

NORTHCOM has increased the US Government’s ability to react to the next disaster or attack, but is hampered from many of the tasks that may be required to be more proactive in the war with militant Islamists.¹²⁴ For example, NORTHCOM is not able to track terror threats directly within the United States because the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act and Posse Comitatus Act limit the use of active duty military, or Title 10 US Code forces to perform those tasks.¹²⁵

State Level

State counter-terror organizations differ from state to state based on population density and geographic location. Their counter-terror offices resemble the federal level much more than they do their local or county level counterparts. Nearly every state has a homeland security office with representation on their region’s JTTF Executive Board. That state office shares information directly with the federal Department of Homeland Security as well as with counties and cities within their state.

Many states also have fusion centers, which are a scaled down version of the FBI’s JTTF

¹²² US Northern Command Mission, “About USNORTHCOM,” Northern Command, <http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html> [accessed February 25, 2008].

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ William Webster, interview by author, Kansas City, MO, October 1, 2007.

¹²⁵ Elizabeth Bazan, *The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act* [Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2007], 9-10.

concept. The fusion centers share information with Federal agencies in order to complete the information sharing structure from the federal to the local counter-terror organization.¹²⁶ There are over 40 state and regional fusion centers across the United States with varied membership that “...when networked together nationally, represent a proactive tool to be used to fight a global jihadist adversary...”¹²⁷ Figure 2 shows the crucial connection that state entities play between the federal and local levels of the US Counter-Terrorism Structure.

Because states have far less input into the creating of counter-terror policy and funding decisions, they have used collective organizations to get their homeland security priorities addressed at the national level. All fifty states and five territory governors are members of the National Governors Association (NGA), a bipartisan organization of state governors that share best practices and speak with a unified voice at the federal level. Some of the more important policies concerning homeland security that the NGA addresses are equitable counter-terror funding from the federal to local levels, state input into CT funds allocation on local initiatives, and increasing both the quantity and capabilities of fusion centers.¹²⁸

Local Level

The local level of the Counter-Terrorism Structure is as varied as the citizens that live in the communities. As shown in the diagram, city counter-terror representatives do not report to or through county counter-terror representatives. Rather both city and county are contained within a state’s CT structure. In large urban areas, cities and counties also maintain representation in the JTTF for their region. The Kansas City JTTF is an example of a large JTTF with local law

¹²⁶ Thomas McNamara, *Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan* [Washington: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2006], 71-73.

¹²⁷ Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins, *Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress* [Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2007], 2.

¹²⁸ Jane Bullock, et al., *Introduction to Homeland Security*, [Burlington: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2006], 135-139.

enforcement membership. It has law enforcement personnel from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Independence, Missouri, Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas City Missouri as well as counties in both western Missouri and eastern Kansas.¹²⁹

The size of the city or county, its population density and demographics, and its geographic location determine much of the counter-terror capabilities they possess. For example, New York City has a large robust counter-terror organization. The New York Police Department has its own intelligence bureau and a unit within it, the NYPD Shield, which produces terrorism analysis reports in order to share counter-terror information with public and private organizations. One such terror analysis report is an important resource for the homegrown threat depicted in this monograph.¹³⁰

Smaller and rural cities are dependent upon counter-terror information from state and national levels to keep them abreast of potential threats in and around their area or responsibility. As a counter to being at the end of the US Counter-Terrorism Structure, city governments use national organizations in order to make their homeland security concerns known at the national level. City members of the US Conference of Mayors (USCM) or the National League of Cities (NLC) share knowledge and gain national exposure on homeland security issues.¹³¹ The 2008 USCM *Mayors' 10-Point Plan* highlights their three main collective concerns for the year; first responder funding, transit security, and comprehensive immigration reform.¹³² Two significant USCM homeland security accomplishments from 2007 were the 110th Congress' enacting 9/11 Commission recommendations to increase funding for high-risk urban areas, emergency

¹²⁹ Cudmore.

¹³⁰ New York Police Department, "NYPD Shield: Countering Terrorism through Information Sharing," <http://www.nypdshield.org/public/> [accessed March 10, 2008].

¹³¹ Bullock, et al., 125-129.

¹³² The United States Conference of Mayors, "Mayors' 10-Point Plan '08," United States Conference of Mayors, http://usmayors.org/uscm/news/press_releases/documents/10-PointPlan_1107.pdf [accessed February 24, 2008], 8.

management, and transit security and the second was a law that creates a stand-alone Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant.¹³³ County governments have a similar organization to present a national voice for their counter-terror concerns; the National Association of Counties (NACo).¹³⁴ It is not economically or logistically feasible that every city, township, tribe, or county government have membership on a state or regional JTTF or have its own fusion center. For that reason, the USCM, the NLC, and the NACo are important because they provide national-level homeland security information to the lowest levels of the Counter-Terrorism Structure.

Summary of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure

The United States Counter-Terrorism Structure has improved significantly since 9/11. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security and Northern Command as well as the reorganization of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are important improvements to the Structure. The expansion of Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center and state fusion centers has improved collaboration and the sharing of terrorist threat information throughout the entire Counter-Terrorism Structure. The organizations within the Structure have clearer, expanded Counter-terror missions and responsibilities and have been successful for over six years since September 11, 2001. The next chapter will examine whether the improvements noted are sufficient to prevent the next 9/11 militant Islamist attack.

THE US NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRUCTURE EVALUATION

As mentioned, the United States is at war with the militant Islamists within the homeland.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Bullock, et al., 131-135.

The rhetorical questions asked at the start of the previous chapter contained the definitions for the US Army's *Principles of War* from its Field Manual (FM) 3-0. For that chapter, those principles were the lens required to view the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure. In this chapter, more formal and better defined *Principles of War* are the criteria for the evaluation of the United States Counter-Terrorism Structure that has emerged.¹³⁵ Recommended solutions to any problems or seams in the structure will follow immediately after each evaluation discussion.

All twelve of the *Principles of War* relate to the counter-terror conflict to some degree; however, some are more relevant to this war than others are. The eight *Principles* with the most logical connection included for this evaluation are Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Unity of Command, Security, Simplicity, Perseverance, and Legitimacy. Offensive is the act of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. For the United States, Offensive pertains to taking the necessary steps to prevent the next terror attack in the homeland. Wargaming, mission planning, and thorough information sharing are all forms of the initiative required to beat the militant Islamists to their objective. Mass is the concentration of the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time while economy of force is the allocation of minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Those two *Principles* are related in that each adversary has finite capabilities and must choose when and where to use it for the maximum effect. Applying an organization's full power requires Unity of Command. Cooperation and coordination are important, but giving one responsible commander the required authority is the most effective way to achieve unity of effort.¹³⁶ Security describes never permitting the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. Simplicity is a clear, uncomplicated plan that ensures thorough

¹³⁵ U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-0 Operations* (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), A1-A4. In order to avoid cluttering this chapter with footnotes, this footnote will be used for all references to the *Principles of War* in this chapter of the paper. The words *Principles of War* are italicized to show their specific usage within FM 3-0. The *Principles of War* themselves (Offensive, etc) are capitalized to delineate them from regular usage.

¹³⁶ Ibid., A-3.

understanding. Perseverance ensures the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state. In the case of this conflict, it refers to the resolve of the citizenry, leadership, and military of the United States despite discussions of a threat that is not always visible and putting up with security measures that are very evident. Legitimacy closely relates to perseverance in that the National Counter-Terrorism Structure must be seen as operating within the law to maintain the will of the people necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

Four of the *Principles of War* Objective, Maneuver, Surprise, and Restraint are not as valid to the discussion in this paper. The definitions and discussions within FM 3-0 could have allowed these four *Principles* inclusion in this paper, but required a slightly broader interpretation. Therefore, in order to obtain some brevity, only the eight most valid *Principles* were included.

This evaluation divides the United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure into what works and what does not work. The positive or negative evaluation discussion points pertaining to the Structure fall into three areas. They correspond to the key tasks from the previous chapter and are policy, procedure, and resource implementation; communications and information sharing; and contingency plans and rehearsals. These areas contain the most critical tasks required for the Counter-Terrorism Structure to stop the next terror attack. The presentation of the evaluation of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure is similar to the US Army's after action review format. Each issue has the general flow of presentation, discussion and analysis, and finally, recommended solutions.

What Works?

Although this paper focuses upon areas within the National Counter-Terrorism Structure where improvement is desired, significant progress has been made since 9/11. In this section, there will be no recommendations following the discussion of the issues. This is simply recognition that not all is wrong with the National Counter-Terrorism Structure.

The first three examples of what works are all improvements to the organization of the Counter-Terrorism Structure. The creation of both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) consolidation of its counter-terror and WMD functions within a single branch all make the Structure more robust.

The creation of the DHS supports *Unity of Command*, because it is a consolidation of offices under one executive secretary that secures the United States within and at the entryways into the nation. That occurs through the missions of the US Coast Guard, the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The Coast Guard provides security in the waters around the United States and up to the maritime borders. They hand off jurisdiction for security matters at the ports.¹³⁷ The CBP secures the national borders and overlaps with the TSA in the security of the ports of the United States; where they take responsibility from the Coast Guard for ships entering US ports.¹³⁸ The TSA's airport screening and its securing of other transportation systems within the United States completes the layers of security approach to securing access into and travel within the United States.¹³⁹ Because of the risks to the United States of a successful nuclear detonation, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established April 15, 2005 within the DHS. Because of this paper's focus on the most damaging end of the Terror Attack Spectrum (Figure 1), the DNDO office is included within the discussion of improvements within the National Counter-Terrorism Structure. The DNDO seeks "...to improve the Nation's capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the

¹³⁷ DHS, "Missions: Ready Today...Preparing for Tomorrow," United States Coast Guard, <http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions> [accessed February 26, 2008].

¹³⁸ DHS, "CBP Border Security Spotlight," United States Customs and Border Protection, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security [accessed February 26, 2008].

¹³⁹ DHS, "Layers of Security," Transportation Security Administration, http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/index.shtm [accessed February 26, 2008].

Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time.”¹⁴⁰ Notwithstanding its problems presented later in this chapter, the DHS and the consolidation of security tasks under it has improved the National Counter-Terrorism Structure.

The creation of NORTHCOM in 2002, clearly delineated a Department of Defense role within the National Counter-Terrorism Structure and supports Unity of Command. NORTHCOM conducts exercises with national, state, and local law enforcement organizations that build the national infrastructure database, look at vulnerabilities in existing and planned contingency plans, and help the United States maintain the initiative in the war with militant Islamists.¹⁴¹ That is support for the *Principle* of Offensive because the exercises help to find flaws in CONPLANs and maintains their initiative over the enemy. The remedying of problems discovered during those exercises is support of Security. An example of NORTHCOM’s review of a CONPLAN was their recent exercise in conjunction with the School of Advanced Military Studies. That exercise gave NORTHCOM an outside view of a recently completed planning document. After action review comments from both students and NORTHCOM planning staff stated that the exercise was beneficial and future SAMS classes should continue working with NORTHCOM.¹⁴²

A Presidential memorandum dated June 29, 2005 established the National Security Branch (NSB) within the FBI in response to the recommendations within the “Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (March 31, 2005)”¹⁴³ to consolidate all counter-terror efforts within one branch under a single Executive Assistant Director. Also, within the NSB the WMD Directorate consolidated

¹⁴⁰ DHS, “Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,” The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0766.shtm [accessed February 26, 2008].

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Author was present during the exercise and the after action review.

¹⁴³ George W. Bush, “Strengthening the Ability of the Department of Justice to Meet Challenges to the Security of the Nation,” www.whitehouse.gov, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050629-1.html> (accessed March 21, 2008).

functions that were formerly spread throughout the Bureau.¹⁴⁴ The consolidation of like functions with branches and directorates puts a unity of effort under one responsible leader and is support for the *Principle* of Unity of Command.

A fourth example of what works is the significantly better intelligence sharing and collaboration through the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), and fusion centers. These organizations support *Security* because they improve the collective knowledge of individual and the overall threat throughout the Counter-Terrorism Structure. They also support *Economy of Force*, because organizations will not duplicate collection and analysis functions. Information gained by a law enforcement or homeland security organization that is shared within a JTTF or fusion center will lessen the likelihood that another member of that collaboration cell will use its own assets to do the work that is already complete or ongoing. The NCTC, JTTF, and fusion centers also support the *Principle of War* Offensive, because the organizations within them have increased threat awareness, which increases their initiative and decreases their surprise at militant Islamist actions.

What Does not Work?

The previous section showed four examples of progress made within the National Counter-Terrorism Structure since 9/11, but does not answer whether it can prevent the next terror attack in the United States. This section will analyze selected problem areas or seams in the Structure and provide recommendations following the discussion of the issues.

The first problem is the existence of three different federal-level headquarters for the National Counter-Terrorism Structure to command and control the war with militant Islamists within the United States. This situation violates the *Principles* of Unity of Command and

¹⁴⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation, "National Security Branch," Federal Bureau of Investigation, <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/nsb.htm> [accessed March 10, 2008].

Simplicity. A clear chain of command is important to any organization that is engaged in a war. The three headquarters- the DHS, DoJ, and DoD- all have a significant piece of the counter-terror fight. There must be one headquarters within the United States government that leads this fight. The solution could be to move the National Security Branch from the FBI to the DHS and to place NORTCOM under the control of DHS. The latter command structure would be complex, but would have all forces under one responsible commander, the definition of Unity of Command, for all forces engaged in the war with militant Islamists.

The next seam in the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure is the attitude of the citizens and the government of the United States. Although the American people are not part of the Structure, they affect the conduct of the war with militant Islamists a great deal. Their willingness to support counter-terrorism initiatives in order to make the nation more secure cannot be underestimated. Because the President of the United States is failing to label the conflict between the National Counter-Terrorism Structure and militant Islamists a war, he runs the risk of losing the support of the American people for security improvements and new policies that may require sacrifice from the citizenry. This violates the *Principles* of Legitimacy and Perseverance. The United States has shown excellent perseverance to date, but is wavering abroad and at home. Just nine days after the events of 9/11, President Bush told the citizens of the United States to keep on shopping.¹⁴⁵ Now after six and a half years without a significant terror attack in the United States, the quote, “America is not at war. The Marine Corps is at war; America is at the mall” may be entirely too accurate.¹⁴⁶ If the American public has divorced itself of caring about the war with militant Islamists in the homeland, then the US government

¹⁴⁵ George Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” Whitehouse.org, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> (accessed January 13, 2008)

¹⁴⁶ James P. McGovern, “The Iraq money pit,” Boston Globe, October 4, 2004, http://www.Boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/10/04/the_iraq_money_pit (accessed January 18, 2008).

will have a difficult task of implementing any policy that requires sacrifice from the people. Of course, this quote is not a summary of every American's attitude, but as the wars overseas and the lack of focus on the war in the homeland drag on, it will be harder and harder to provide the proper budgeting and government focus. The National Counter-Terrorism Structure will be hurt by losses of funding and focus, which will play into the hands of the militant Islamists who are patiently waiting for our guard to be sufficiently lowered. The militant Islamists can then execute an attack that may take more than a few buildings in two cities like those of 9/11.

The United States' porous borders that allow militant Islamists to smuggle men and material for the next terror attack violates the *Principle of Security*. That is because it gives the militant Islamists the advantage of entering the United States at times and in numbers for which the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure do not have awareness. Special Agent Cudmore stated that once the militant Islamists are inside the United States it is possible for them to remain off the counter-terror radar if they do nothing that is illegal. In that situation, law enforcement and homeland security organizations would have no reason to watch them or their actions or to even know they exist within the country. Those militant Islamists who enter the US undetected can plan and execute the next terror attack relatively freely. The borders of the United States must be sealed to militant Islamist entry. Placing a fence on the borders would take years and potentially billions of dollars. Also, a fence on the border does nothing more than a military obstacle that does not have friendly forces watching it. A border fence is not only exceptionally expensive, but if it remains unwatched, then determined militant Islamists will simply go over or under it eventually. There are too few Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel on the borders under the current "no fence" scenario. There are still not enough to watch a fence.

Augmenting the CBP with active duty US military forces would be less expensive and more quickly implemented than a border fence. A problem with doing as much is the reluctance to use active duty military in the homeland because of the Posse Comitatus Act. If the potential military forces were used in roles that are not law enforcement in nature, then the problem is that

there are approximately 160,000 US service members tied down in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Barbarians attacked Rome while its Army was abroad fighting in much the same way the United States is at war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The high percentage of US forces overseas fighting militant Islamists are not engaged with the most direct threat to the United States homeland. Because of the need for a large amount of US combat forces on the borders, the *Principles of War* of Mass and Economy of Force are violated. The United States does not have a sufficient concentration of combat forces at the decisive place, the borders, and time, now. In order to use active duty soldiers to control the borders of the United States, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan must be resolved to the point that sufficient units could be redeployed.

Another problem with the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure is that NORTHCOM is nearly entirely reactive in its primary roles. Within the NORTHCOM mission statement are proactive security phrases such as *anticipates* and *conducts homeland defense*.¹⁴⁷ Significant limitations make it difficult for NORTHCOM to execute a proactive defense. As discussed, the use of active duty military on our borders or in other important defensive roles could improve the security of the United States. Those forces should come under the direction of NORTHCOM but would have to overcome the limitations of the antiquated Posse Comitatus Act.

There is a lack of secure communications across the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure. The situation violates *Security* because wireless phone calls and data transmissions can be intercepted. Even landline communications can be intercepted or tapped. Among the completed surveys, there was no duplication of secure communications solutions between any two. That means that each lower level organization could present new and unique connectivity problems for a JTTF, fusion center, or higher level organization with whom the local organization is attempting to communicate. The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) was

¹⁴⁷ US Northern Command, "About USNORTHCOM," Northern Command, <http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html> [accessed February 25, 2008].

designed to create an information sharing network for the entire Counter-Terrorism Structure. A 2007 Government Accounting Office report stated that, because the DHS rushed to deploy HSIN after 9/11,

...the department did not fully develop joint strategies and coordinated policies, [did] not develop a comprehensive inventory of key state and local information-sharing initiatives, and it did not achieve a full understanding of the relevance of the Regional Information Sharing Systems program to homeland security information sharing.¹⁴⁸

The DHS spent \$611.8 million over fiscal years 2005 and 2006 on the HSIN, a system that duplicates existing, ongoing information sharing initiatives. As a result, the DHS faces the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring and that HSIN may be duplicating state and local capabilities.¹⁴⁹ An existing solution would be for the organizations within the National Counter-Terrorism Structure to tie into existing Department of Defense communications architecture; aka the Global Information Grid (GIG). Establish baseline communication capabilities that local, state, and federal agencies must adhere to for inter-agency secure communications. Establish recommended secure communication suite solutions and establish contracts with vendors to provide those solutions. Economies of scale and cheaper solutions will be realized.

There is a lack of contingency plans (CONPLAN) and scenario wargaming throughout the National Counter-Terrorism Structure. This violates *Simplicity*, because it can prevent a true understanding of the organization's threat situation. Weak or absent CONPLANs also violates *Offensive*, because the Structure has given up the initiative. The organizations within the US Counter-Terrorism Structure must continue to look for weaknesses the enemy could exploit. Failing to do so abdicates the initiative to the militant Islamists. Security is violated because poor

¹⁴⁸ David Powner, *Information Technology: Homeland Security Information Network Needs to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Initiatives* [Washington: Government Accounting Office, 2007], ii-2.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

or unimproved CONPLANS are evidence that the organization has not taken measures to protect itself from enemy surprise. Survey responses for this paper concerning CONPLANS covered the full range of possible answers from a simple yes without any elaboration; to a thorough explanation of how the organization conducted exercises to verify their plans; to responses that the organization did not complete exercises at all. For example, the respondent for Alabama stated, “Yes” to the question of whether it conducted readiness exercises but with reference to checking subordinate organizations “No, state gov[ernment] is not like a military chain of command. There are no subordinate org[anization] counter-terror plans in Alabama.”¹⁵⁰ The absence of a plan or an unwillingness to test a plan for a particular contingency that militant Islamists may execute invites disaster. Wargaming of homeland security issues shows weaknesses within the plan and every iteration makes the CONPLAN stronger and reveals other weaknesses that in turn can be corrected. Wargaming or testing of CONPLANS does not have to remain strictly within the purview of the organizations that make up the Structure. Recently Kansas University and the Fort Leavenworth Homeland Security Studies within the Command and General Staff College cooperated on homeland security issues in the eastern Kansas area. Any organization, from private business or from within the Counter-Terrorism Structure, can analyze a situation. The National Counter-Terrorism Structure needs federal and state teams that check the validity and thoroughness of contingency plans throughout the Structure.

Summary of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure Evaluation

There are significant areas within the United States Counter-Terrorism Structure that need improvement immediately. The situation on the US-Canada and US-Mexico borders simply must be fixed. More combat forces than the US Customs and Border Patrol are required to properly secure both borders and the use of active duty military is the quickest and cheapest

¹⁵⁰ Survey respondent from Alabama who asked not to be quoted.

option. The United States must look at the conflict in the homeland between the Counter-Terrorism Structure and militant Islamists as a war and mentally prepare for an extended conflict. The advantages for the United States from its improved collaboration and information sharing centers within the Counter-Terrorism Structure can be quickly reversed if communications between its organizations are not secure and information is not secured. The HSIN must be standardized and implemented as quickly as is possible.

CONCLUSIONS

The United States is at war with militant Islamists and if significant changes are not made in the policies and procedures within the United States and its National Counter-Terrorism Structure, the next terror attack will occur and will be more powerful than those on September 11, 2001 were. The militant Islamists have proven themselves quite capable over the past six years around the world. Their failures within the United States have been noted and exceptional; are either the result of the improved US National Counter-Terrorism Structure, amateurish militant Islamists, or most terrifying that their failures are part of a plan to convince the United States that there is no longer a plausible threat within the country. That last scenario would fit quite neatly as a deception plan to a larger plan to attack the United States with an attack more powerful and damaging than those on September 11, 2001.

The borders of the United States must be sealed to militant Islamist entry. Placing a fence on the border does nothing more than a military obstacle that does not have friendly forces watching it. A border fence is not only exceptionally expensive, but if it remains unwatched, then determined militant Islamists will simply go over or under it eventually. In order to use active duty soldiers to control the borders of the United States, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan must be resolved to the point that sufficient units could be redeployed. The use of active duty military on our borders would also have to overcome the limitations emplaced by the antiquated Posse Comitatus Act. Until the borders with Canada and Mexico are sealed to militant Islamist traffic,

the United States is at an incredible risk to another terror attack. The United States is more vulnerable with so much of its military tied down in counter-insurgencies and nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US is distracted; and not just the DoD, with the fights in those nations.

Threats to the United States are potentially a matter of national survival therefore acts of war and not criminal activity. The attitude of the American public toward the war between militant Islamists and the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure must be refocused. The reality of the threat and the potential severity of the next attack must be made real to citizens of the United States. The President said this will be a long war and no one disagrees. The attitude Americans had toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War should be the model. Containment worked against that enemy because the threat was made and kept real. The threat of nuclear annihilation was real enough to the average citizen that he was willing to have missiles in their state or large portions of the United States budget go towards defense initiatives. The continued defeat of the militant Islamist threat requires the same sustained commitment from all Americans. Without buy in from all Americans, preventative measures, especially costly ones, will not have the long-term support from Americans and therefore, eventually will not have the long-term support of their congressional representatives.

APPENDIX 1: COUNTER-TERROR ORGANIZATION SURVEY

An important source of data about the state, county, and local levels of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure was an author produced and distributed a survey. There were three different versions of the survey; one each for the state level, the county level, and the city/township level. The purpose of the surveys was to verify that the goals stated at the national level disseminated throughout the Counter-Terrorism Structure and to acquire information about the structure, capabilities, and information sharing procedures of the structure. The state version of the survey went to all fifty states and eleven states returned completed surveys. Only one of the states attempted to verify the author was a Major in the United States Army and not a potential terrorist who had stolen the author's email address. The county version went to approximately twenty-five counties across the United States, three returned completed surveys, and none attempted to verify the author's identity. The city or township survey went to nearly 300 cities and townships across the country, fifteen returned completed surveys, and three attempted to verify the author's identity.

The completed surveys provided valuable information about the different levels of the Counter-Terrorism Structure for this chapter and the evaluation of the structure in the next chapter. The information helped to corroborate or refute statements made by the other levels of the Counter-Terrorism Structure. The following four pages is the state survey that was emailed to all fifty states. Slightly different versions of this document were sent to counties and cities/townships.

Counter-Terror Organization Survey for Major John Demko, US Army

Email: john.demko@us.army.mil

Telephone: 913-250-xxxx

Postal Address: xx Rose Loop / Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Thank you for taking the time to answer the questions for my research paper. Please use this form and fill it out electronically. If anyone from your organization would like to contact me prior to returning this survey in order to ensure I am not an adversary please use the email address and telephone number above. I understand such precautions.

This survey is a Microsoft Word document and I have provided only two blank lines between questions. I expect anyone answering the survey will need more space. If it being answered electronically, they can get more space by using the “Enter” key to move the remaining questions further down the document. If possible, please use a **different color** and/or *font* to differentiate your answers from my questions.

Although I am sure that speaking to personnel in your organization about this survey would be helpful to my research, I need an electronic copy returned to me. That is because I will likely have a myriad of responses from the hundreds of law enforcement agencies to which I am sending this survey.

Please return by as soon as possible. The original requested date was February 12, 2008. I much prefer to receive responses by email to the address above. If you have additional information or data that you would like to share that you cannot email, then please use the postal address above. If you find that there is useful information about which I did not ask, please include as much as you would prefer.

If there are subordinate or peer-level organizations from which valuable data could be obtained for my paper, feel free to forward this survey and the introduction letter to them or give me their contact information when you return this survey.

Contact Data

Organization: _____ Date: _____

Name: _____ Position: _____

Phone: _____ Email: _____

Postal Address: _____

Survey Questions

1. I can omit from my paper any references to you and your organization if that will help you answer more openly and freely. I must have names and contact information in the case I have to verify the validity of a source, a position, or an answer. Based on this information, may I quote your responses within my paper? Yes / No. If yes, but you have limitations; please provide them in this space.

2. Does your state government or police have a counter-terror or fusion center/cell division or individual? Yes / No. If your answer to this question is “Yes”, go to Question 2a and if your answer is “No”, go to Question 2b.

Answer:

2a. Where in your state government or police hierarchy does it reside? If you have a line and block chart of your organization, please attach. **Answer:**

2b. If there is no counter-terror or fusion center/cell division or individual in your state

government or police, how does your state prevent terror activities?

[Answer:](#)

3. How does your state counter-terror organization fit into the United States counter-terror hierarchy? Stated differently, how does your state coordinate with federal counter-terror organizations and/or subordinate counter-terror organizations? If you have a line and block chart of your organization, please attach. [Answer:](#)

4. Does your state counter-terror organization send information about threats within your state to federal agencies, other states, or subordinate counter-terror organizations? Yes / No. If your answer to this question is “Yes”, go to Question 4a and if your answer is “No”, go to Question 4b. [Answer:](#)

4a. Please elaborate to what higher and subordinate counter-terror organizations your state counter-terror organization sends information and the type of counter-terror information you share. [Answer:](#)

4b. How does your state counter-terror organization make higher-level, other state, or subordinate counter-terror organizations aware of potential terror threats and your counter-terror efforts in your state? [Answer:](#)

5. Does your state counter-terror organization receive information from federal and/or subordinate counter-terror organizations? Yes / No. If your answer to this question is “Yes”, go to Question 5a and if your answer is “No”, go to Question 5b. [Answer:](#)

5a. Please describe the type of information your state counter-terror organization receives, from which organization is received, the quality of the information, and the accuracy and timeliness of the data. [Answer:](#)

5b. Does not receiving counter-terror information from higher and lower counter-terror organization organizations affect your ability to effectively keep abreast of potential terror threats in your state? [Answer:](#)

6. How does your state counter-terror organization conduct secure voice and data communications with other agencies in order to discuss classified counter-terror information? [Answer:](#)

7. Has there been an instance where your state counter-terror organization and another organization with which you are attempting to share classified information had different information classification means or there was system incompatibility that prevented sending or receiving classified information? (For example, a DoD Secret classification may not mean the same to your state organization) If so, please elaborate. [Answer:](#)

8. What is the nature of the threats you monitor in your state? (For example: terrorist charities and fund raising, terrorist recruiting, or multi-dimensional terrorist threats to physical targets, etc) Remember, that if this information is classified, even generic responses can assist my research. [Answer:](#)

9. What is the nature of the potential terror targets for which your state counter-terror organization must provide protection? (For example: Government buildings, landmarks, power plants, dams, significant power transfer points, shopping malls, etc) Remember, that if this

information is classified, even generic responses can assist my research. [Answer:](#)

10. Does your state conduct readiness exercises to ensure your internal counter-terror contingency plans are up to date, adequate, and cover the full spectrum of possible threats in your area of responsibility? Yes / No. If your answer to this question is “Yes”, go to Question 10a and if your answer is “No”, go to Question 10b. In either case, answer Question 10c. [Answer:](#)

10a. What is the type and frequency of counter-terror readiness exercises your state conducts to test your internal contingency plans? [Answer:](#)

10b. How does your state ensure that its counter-terror contingency plans are up to date, adequate, and cover the full spectrum of possible threats in your state? [Answer:](#)

10c. When gaps are discovered in your state’s counter-terror contingency plans, what steps are taken to correct problems and how quickly are they remedied? [Answer:](#)

11. Does your state conduct exercises and checks of subordinate organization counter-terror contingency plans to ensure they are current, adequate, and cover the full spectrum of possible threats in their area of responsibility? Yes / No. If your answer to this question is “Yes”, go to Question 11a and if your answer is “No”, go to Question 11b. In either case, answer Question 11c. [Answer:](#)

11a. What is the type and frequency of counter-terror readiness exercises your state conducts to test your subordinate organization contingency plans?
[Answer:](#)

11b. How does your state ensure that its subordinate organization counter-terror contingency plans are up to date, adequate, and cover the full spectrum of possible threats in their area of responsibility? [Answer:](#)

11c. When gaps are discovered in your subordinate organization’s counter-terror contingency plans, what steps are taken to correct problems and how quickly are they remedied?
[Answer:](#)

12. Do civil liberties organizations or established laws hinder your state’s ability to actively prevent terror activities in your area of responsibility? If so, please elaborate. [Answer:](#)

13. What is the worst case scenario threat that your state counter-terror organization actively works to prevent within your state? [Answer:](#)

14. In your opinion, is your state counter-terror organization able to prevent all potential threats within your state? Please elaborate in either case. [Answer:](#)

15. If there is any other information that you think would be useful for me to use to accurately portray the Counter-Terrorism Structure and its effectiveness within your state, please include it herein or contact me with details on how to acquire it.

END OF SURVEY – THANK YOU

APPENDIX 2: A CONVENTIONAL TERROR ATTACK SCENARIO

The following section is a potential scenario of a complex terror attack within the United States at a time in the future. The warfare methods that the adversary uses in the scenario are all methods of attack listed in *Unrestricted Warfare* by Qiao Lang and Wang Ziangsui.¹⁵¹ This scenario is placed here as an appendix because its length would be a distraction within the body of the paper.

The Situation

For the United States, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are going well enough to allow considerable combat forces to be withdrawn without negative consequences in either country. The Posse Comitatus Act and the “don’t tap my phone” bloc in the United States are still hindering the incorporation of those redeployed forces into the homeland defense of the country. The US economy continues to stagnate well past the 2008 election.

Conversely, things are going very well in Russia. Its economy, fueled by new oil and natural gas discoveries, continues to grow. Russia has been using that economic muscle to reinvigorate its military and sees the weakened US economy and military as having created the perfect time to regain buffers against the West. Russian leaders do not want a military confrontation with the United States, but they need the latter to be sufficiently distracted and weakened to allow Russia to correct some of the mistakes and affronts from the 1990s. How can Russia make this a reality?

The Plan

Several talented Russian Army officers from their revitalized military- having read *Unrestricted Warfare*, an article written in 1999 by Chinese Army officers Qiao Lang and Wang Ziangsui- propose the use of its tenants for Mother Russia’s purposes. Russian leaders decide to

use unrestricted warfare to neutralize the United States and cover their tracks by engineering the evidence to make it appear as though global militant Islamists conducted the attacks.

The Attack

Step One (Agro-Terrorism)

The Russian's first front would be a protracted attack on the US economy designed to distract US attention for a long period of time. Packed in the suitcases of several Russian operatives, dressed to look like unassuming Russian tourists, are sealed bags of clothing soaked with bovine saliva that is contaminated with foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). Once the Russian operatives safely land in Kansas City, Denver, Chicago, Atlanta, and Minneapolis, they hand off the contaminated material to Russian mob employees who work in the US beef industry. The latter's positions put them in contact with a significant percentage of the US beef industry. Within two weeks of infecting the first cattle, the signs that something is wrong with herds of cows begin to show. By the third week, the entire beef industry is in chaos as interstate movement of cattle is halted and wholesale shipments of beef cattle are burned because of real or potential contamination.

Step Two (Cyber Warfare)

In the middle of the food supply crisis in the United States, a massive and thorough cyber attack is launched. The attacks come on a Monday and range from simple distributed denial of service attacks to full penetration of secure government networks. The cyber war front focuses first against the Department of Defense, then shifts to the Department of State, and finally rages against Wall Street. The cyber attacks last only a few hours and do no long-term harm; however, the story dominates the news and adds to the confusion in the United States.

Step Three (Assassinations)

The morning following the cyber attacks, the wives of two Army Generals and the son of a Navy Captain are shot dead in or around their vehicles as they conducted normal activities outside their respective military installations. The gunmen, more Russian operatives, identified

their targets easily because of the prominently displayed blue stars and blue eagle stickers in the respective windshields of their vehicles.

Step Four (Terror Warfare)

At 12:13 pm the same day as the assassinations, five men, Russian mob men, walk into the Dayton Mall on Miamisburg Centerville Road in Dayton, Ohio. Two of the men walk to the center of the mall, while the three remaining men each move to one of the mall's main exits. They keep their heads down to avoid security cameras but avoid scrutiny because of their conservative business suits and briefcases; they could be coming to the mall's food court for lunch. In one motion the two gunmen in the center of the mall put on masks and shoot the only two security guards on duty while shouting "God is great" in Arabic. Panic-stricken shoppers race toward the exits but are met by a hail of bullets from the other, now masked, operatives stationed at the three aforementioned main exits. After only one minute the five men stop firing their handguns having reloaded several times per weapon. Bodies lie everywhere as the men jump into a plain white van, having left their explosives laden briefcases set for detonation randomly from three to thirteen minutes. The van drives a short distance down Mad River Road, turns left onto Shady Water Lane, and finally turns left into the driveway and backyard of a house on that street. The five men set booby traps on the van, having earlier done the same on both doors of the house, and enter a recently stolen taxi stored in the garage. As explosions rip the mall, no one thinks about the taxi heading toward Interstate-75 and out of sight. The stolen taxi is found later that day with militant Islamist literature, printed off of the Internet. A phone bill also left in the taxi, addressed to the house on Shady Water Lane, lead police to the booby-trapped house and van and further carnage.

Step Five (Psychological Warfare)

On Wednesday, Russian operatives, acting as al-Qaeda, release a statement to al-Jazeera that claims responsibility for the attacks within the United States. The communiqué goes on to say that the attacks to date are just the beginning of an onslaught of justice against the United

States and its corrupted citizens. Later that day an official Russian release is barely noticed; it condemns the terrorist actions within the United States and offers its help in finding the guilty parties. The Russian statement goes on to say that the unstable conditions within Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Belarus require attention of the world's leadership.

Step Six (Conventional Warfare)

Citing the chaos in the United States and the need for immediate action, Russian military forces move into the three “troubled” former Soviet Republics to keep the peace on its borders. With the world's attention focused on the situation in the United States little more than the objections from the “assisted” nations' former governments are registered in the United Nations. When Russian and Belarusian forces cross into Ukraine, it is obvious Russia is taking advantage of the chaos in the United States. When the “USA” beacon is beamed onto the clouds in a desperate cry for help to stop the Russian juggernaut, the world's lone hegemonic power is too preoccupied at home to answer the call.

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